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Article

The Benefits and Costs of Economic
Sanctions: Considering the Victim, the
Offender, and Society
R. Barry Ruback

†

Economic sanctions comprise six different types of legallyrequired transfers of money or other value from an offender to
1
a crime victim or a governmental agency. They are often one of
2
several conditions of a criminal sentence, and over the past
twenty-five years they have become more frequently imposed—
twenty-five percent of prisoners received economic sanctions in
3
1991, but by 2004 the percentage was sixty-six percent. This
trend toward increasing the use of economic sanctions is likely
to continue, primarily because the costs of administering criminal justice have risen substantially. In major part, costs are
high because there are so many people under correctional su4
pervision, almost seven million at yearend 2012. Corrections
† R. Barry Ruback, B.A., Yale University, J.D., University of Texas,
Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, is a professor of Criminology and Sociology at
Penn State University. He is a member of the State Bar Associations of Texas
and Georgia and has been a Visiting Fellow at the National Institute of Justice and a Judicial Fellow of the Supreme Court of the United States, assigned
to the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Since 2003, he has been a consultant to
the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, conducting research examining
the predictors and effects of sentencing decisions, particularly economic sanctions. The writing of this article was partially supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant # 1127014). Copyright © 2015 by R. Barry Ruback.
1. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 A–D (Tentative Draft
No. 3, Apr. 24, 2014).
2. See Sally T. Hillsman, Fines and Day Fines, in 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 49, 61 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1990).
Typically, economic sanctions in the United States are additional penalties,
rather than sole sanctions. Id. at 49.
3. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood
from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United
States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1769 (2010).
4. At yearend 2012, there were about 6.94 million offenders under adult
correctional supervision in the United States: 3.94 million on probation (the
most common criminal sentence), 1.48 million in prison, 0.74 million in jail,
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5

alone account for about seven percent of state budgets. Because of these rising costs and the absence of increasing revenues to cover them, jurisdictions are now more likely to make
offenders pay for at least part of these costs, including the costs
6
of supervision and incarceration.
Related to the high use of incarceration is the increasing
need for intermediate sanctions that are more severe than mere
probation but less severe, and less expensive, than imprison7
ment. Because probation accounts for about fifty-seven percent
8
of individuals under correctional supervision, the need for effective intermediate sanctions affects millions of offenders.
In addition to these concerns about offenders and the costs
to society, there are also concerns about crime victims, particularly about increasing the likelihood that victims will receive
9
restitution for their losses from the crime. Every state now has
a statute authorizing restitution, and twenty states have ele10
vated restitution to a constitutional right.
However, simply because these economic sanctions are imposed does not mean that they are collected. And, in fact,
enormous amounts of the monies that are owed are unpaid. In
and 0.85 million on parole. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 3 (2013), available at http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf.
5. CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FISCAL
CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 3 (2009),
available at http://www.vera.org/files/The-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections_July-2009
.pdf.
6. See David E. Olson & Gerard F. Ramker, Crime Does Not Pay, But
Criminals May: Factors Influencing the Imposition and Collection of Probation
Fees, 22 JUSTICE SYS. J. 29, 30 (2001); Fox Butterfield, Many Local Officials
Now Make Inmates Pay Their Own Way, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at A1,
A17.
7. See Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, in 20
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99, 100 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1996).
8. See GLAZE & HERBERMAN, supra note 4.
9. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW
DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 357 (1998) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS], available at https://www
.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/directions/pdftxt/direct.pdf; R. Barry Ruback, Gretchen
R. Ruth & Jennifer N. Shaffer, Assessing the Impact of Statutory Change: A
Statewide Multilevel Analysis of Restitution Orders in Pennsylvania, 51 CRIME
& DELINQ. 318, 319 (2005); R. Barry Ruback & Jennifer N. Shaffer, The Role
of Victim-Related Factors in Victim Restitution: A Multi-Method Analysis of
Restitution in Pennsylvania, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 657, 658 (2005).
10. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 356; PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY,
MARIO T. GABOURY, ARRICK L. JACKSON & ASHLEY G. BLACKBURN, CRIME
VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 157 (2d ed. 2010).
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the federal system, for example, the Justice Department is
seeking to recover ninety-seven billion dollars in fines, fees, and
11
restitution.
The primary criticism of monetary sanctions is that they
12
“are inherently inequitable,” in that they are unfair to many
offenders who have little or no money but who face charges of
hundreds or thousands of dollars, which they are unlikely to
ever be able to pay. Aside from affecting their time under criminal justice supervision, these economic sanctions may adversely affect their ability to obtain employment, credit, and hous13
ing. Moreover, in addition to having to deal with criminal
charges, the mere fact that most offenders are poor is likely to
adversely affect all of their important decisions because scarcity places extra cognitive demands that make rational decision
14
making more difficult.
This Article consists of six parts. Part I addresses the question of whether economic sanctions are needed as a sentencing
option. Part II describes and differentiates the primary types of
economic sanctions, which are sometimes simply lumped to15
gether as “fines,” and considers these economic sanctions
along dimensions of time (past orientation vs. future orientation) and target (offender vs. victim vs. society).
In Part III, I discuss practical problems of economic sanctions, the most important of which is determining an offender’s
ability to pay. Other practical problems include determining
economic sanctions when there are multiple types of sanctions,
multiple victims, and multiple crimes and when offenders have
few resources to make payments
In Part IV, I argue that rules regarding economic sanctions
must depend on the type of economic sanction involved. Restitution to victims is the most defensible economic sanction because it can provide the tangible compensation and psychological equity that are preconditions for restorative justice.
Restoring equity can be of benefit to victims, to offenders, and
to society. Fines are not as defensible as restitution, but are
more defensible than costs and fees, because they have poten11. Michael Rothfeld & Brad Reagan, Billions Going Unrecovered: Justice
Department Doesn’t Expect To See Majority of $97 Billion Criminals Owe,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2014, at C1.
12. Tamara Walsh, Juvenile Economic Sanctions: A Logical Alternative?,
13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 69, 71 (2014).
13. See Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1756.
14. See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY
HAVING TOO LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH (2013).
15. See Walsh, supra note 12, at 69.
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tial value as intermediate sanctions in lieu of incarceration.
Moreover, fines can be more directly tailored to the individual
offender’s behavior and circumstances. Costs and fees are the
least defensible sanction, and I argue that they should be prohibited.
In Part IV, recognizing that the elimination of costs and
fees is highly unlikely, I recommend three more realistic
changes regarding restitution: (1) the number of costs and fees
should be reduced, especially at the county level; (2) sanction
amounts should be realistic; and (3) making payments should
be easier. Finally, in Part VII, I mention two issues, guidelines
and research on state variation that need to be addressed in
the future.
I. THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
The foundational question is whether there should even be
economic sanctions. Economic sanctions have four advantages
over both traditional probation and incarceration in jail or prison. First, economic sanctions use a metric that is understood by
everyone, and especially by the legal system. The notion of using money as a means of resolving criminal problems goes back
16
at least a thousand years. In the Middle Ages, victims were
entitled to compensation for injuries (adjusted for their rank in
society), and by the twelfth century, the king was entitled to a
17
fee for administering the system. In contemporary America,
the tort system involves money compensation for injuries. And,
18
in the case of large numbers of victims caused by terrorism
19
and corporate malfeasance, the legal system uses money to
cover the harms suffered.
Second, economic sanctions provide flexibility in that they
can be adjusted to an offender’s specific circumstances, alt20
hough they often are not. Paying economic sanctions is a pun16. The idea of restitution goes back almost four thousand years to the
Code of Hammurabi. Daniel W. Van Ness, Restorative Justice, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 7 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson
eds., 1990).
17. See ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE
SANCTIONS AND PROBATION 153–54 (2d ed. 1997).
18. See, e.g., KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 37 (2005).
19. See, e.g., Jeff Bennett, Kenneth Feinberg on GM Payouts: ‘Fast Is Possible, Fair Isn’t,’ WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 1, 2014, 3:47 PM), http://blogs
.wsj.com/law/2014/07/01/kenneth-feinberg-on-gm-payouts-fast-is-possible-fair
-isnt.
20. See SALLY T. HILLSMAN, BARRY MAHONEY, GEORGE F. COLE &
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21

ishment for most offenders, especially the poor. For wealthy
offenders, the amounts could be increased, so that the adjusted
punishment is approximately equivalent to what is experienced
by those with fewer assets.
Third, economic sanctions can be used to serve different
purposes, including helping the victim, restoring justice to soci22
ety, and punishing the offender.
Fourth, economic sanctions can be used to provide intermediate punishments. At the low end of punishment is traditional probation, which typically includes a number of conditions, such as reporting regularly to a probation officer, not
leaving the county without permission, and not meeting with
23
convicted felons. These conditions, which can number as many
as twenty-five, are often not enforced, as probation officers may
have caseloads over a hundred and may lack the time to ade24
quately supervise offenders. In addition, because probationers
often move, probation officers may not supervise the offenders,
even if they had the time and resources, because they may not
25
even know where probationers are. Thus, probation alone is
generally not very punitive.
At the other, more punitive, extreme, is incarceration in
prison, and for less serious crimes, incarceration in jail. Currently, there are 6.94 million individuals under correctional su26
pervision, approximately 1.5 million of whom are in prison.
Incarceration in prison is expensive and has major effects on
inmates’ social and physical lives, both in prison and subse27
quently after release. And, although there may be some effect
of incarceration on reducing recidivism, the results are clear
that, beyond some point, there is no added deterrence benefit of
28
additional time in prison. Prison is disruptive of family life
BERNARD AUCHTER, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FINES AS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 4
(1987) [hereinafter HILLSMAN ET AL., FINES AS SANCTIONS], available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/106773NCJRS.pdf.
21. See id. at 5.
22. DANIEL MCGILLIS, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CRIME VICTIM
RESTITUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES 5, 11 (1986).
23. See Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, in 22 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 149, 164 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997).
24. See id. at 150.
25. See id. at 169.
26. See GLAZE & HERBERMAN, supra note 4.
27. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA
112–14 (2006).
28. See, e.g., PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, A STUDY ON THE USE AND
IMPACT OF MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY &
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2009), available at http://www.conversations.psu.edu/
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and social networks, makes employment more difficult, and
29
may reduce inmates’ long-term health. Incarceration is highly
punitive and, particularly for those serving long sentences, may
be counterproductive.
Because of dissatisfaction with the lack of supervision of
probation and the harsh punitiveness of incarceration, there
have been numerous calls for intermediate sanctions, which
would give judges and probation officers additional tools to help
offenders learn skills, gain employment, deal with substance
abuse problems, and address social and behavioral problems.
Despite these advantages, it is important to recognize that
economic sanctions also have disadvantages. First, economic
sanctions automatically invoke factors associated with wealth
and poverty, including race, class, education, job skills, and
30
employment. There is also the issue that convicted offenders,
especially those who have been incarcerated, face structural
impediments and interpersonal biases that make reintegration
31
difficult. Second, as discussed later, offenders’ inability to pay
limits the usefulness of economic sanctions. Third, the focus only on economic sanctions is too limiting, as incentives can be
32
economic, social, or moral. The focus on purely economic incentives ignores the fact that human behavior is also affected
by people’s desire to be seen by others in a positive light and to
33
be treated and to treat others fairly. By focusing only on economic incentives, economic sanctions can undermine social and
34
moral sanctions.
docs/SpecRptHR12of2007ExecSum.pdf.
29. See Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The LongTerm Effects of Incarceration on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115,
121–23 (2007).
30. See generally SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 2–4 (David B. Grusky ed., 3d ed. 2008) (discussing the “contours of inequality and exploring its causes”).
31. See Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and
Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 528 (2002).
32. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE
ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 17 (rev. & expanded
ed. 2006).
33. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL
MOTIVATIONS 17, 38–40 (2011).
34. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 1 (2000). In the study by Gneezy and Rustichini, the introduction of a
small fine for parents who were late in picking up their children at a day care
center increased the number of late pickups. Id. at 5–7. The authors interpreted their findings as indicating that parents were willing to pay the fine because the social opprobrium originally associated with late pickups had presumably been removed with the introduction of the fine. Id. at 13–14.
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II. TYPES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Depending on the jurisdiction, economic sanctions are
35
sometimes referred to as monetary sanctions, financial obliga36
37
tions, or legal financial obligations. The revised Model Penal
Code includes provisions for six types of economic sanctions: (1)
restitution, (2) fines, (3) costs, (4) fees, (5) assessments, and (6)
38
asset forfeiture.
As Ruback and Bergstrom argued, criminal sentencing involves two time perspectives (looking to the past and looking to
the future) and three parties (the victim, the offender, and soci39
ety). Looking to the past involves factors about the crime (the
40
type, seriousness, harm caused, and offender’s culpability),
35. See ROBERT W. TOBIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FUNDING THE
STATE COURTS: ISSUES AND APPROACHES 50 (1996), available at http://
cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/financial/id/5.
36. See ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 1 (2010),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%
20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf; Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky,
Debtors’ Prison–Prisoners’ Accumulation of Debt As a Barrier to Reentry, 41 J.
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 187, 187 (2007).
37. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’
PRISONS 5 (2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_
web.pdf.
38. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 A–D (Tentative Draft No. 3,
Apr. 24, 2014). The Model Penal Code addresses asset forfeiture in § 6.04 C
(Tentative Draft No. 3, Apr. 24, 2014). Forfeiture, which can be either criminal
or civil, refers to the government seizure of property that is illegal contraband,
was illegally obtained, was acquired with resources that were illegally obtained, or was used in an illegal activity. Asset forfeiture can constitute serious punishment and “all criminal justice systems seek to confiscate the proceeds of crime or otherwise order the forfeiture of property connected with its
commission.” David Miers, Offender and State Compensation for Victims of
Crime: Two Decades of Development and Change, 20 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY
145, 154 (2014). Criminal justice forfeitures have recently come under severe
criticism for violation of the law. See, e.g., Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow,
Jr. & Steven Rich, Stop and Seize: Aggressive Police Take Hundreds of Millions of Dollars from Motorists Not Charged with Crimes, WASH. POST (Sept. 6,
2014),http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and
-seize; What’s Yours Is Theirs: A Homeowner Challenges Philadelphia’s Abusive Civil Forfeiture Law, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/whats-yours-is-theirs-1409702898. I do not consider the issue
here because there is so little social science evidence on point and because it is
relevant to only certain kinds of crime (generally drug violations). Moreover,
the alleged abuses associated with forfeiture often involve individuals who
were not charged with, much less convicted of, criminal behavior. Sallah,
O’Harrow & Rich, supra.
39. R. Barry Ruback & Mark H. Bergstrom, Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: Purposes, Effects, and Implications, 33 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAV.
242, 245 (2006).
40. See 1 PANEL ON SENTENCING RESEARCH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
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which are relevant to issues of blame, just deserts, and the res41
toration of equity. Blame and just deserts relate primarily to
the offender, whereas considerations of equity relate to restoring the victim and society to the condition they were in before
the crime was committed.
Future-oriented sentencing is concerned with the likelihood that the offender will offend at some point, and thus judges are concerned with reducing crime through deterrence and
rehabilitation. Deterrence-oriented sentences are effective if
they involve a high penalty because a rational offender would
believe that the benefits of any future crime would be less than
the costs he or she would suffer if caught and punished. Rehabilitation-oriented sentences are effective if they induce the offender to believe that crime is wrong.
The relevance of these sanctions depends on the intended
target. For the crime victim, restitution is the only relevant
economic sanction. It is past-oriented, aimed at restoring the
victim, with little or no consideration of punishing the offender.
For the offender, fines and forfeitures are past-oriented economic sanctions, designed to punish the offender for prior behavior (with little or no consideration of reparation to a victim),
and fees are future-oriented in the sense that they pay for ongoing supervision (e.g., probation) and monitoring (e.g., drug
tests). For society, past-oriented economic sanctions are aimed
at making the offender pay for the costs of prosecuting the offender and future-oriented sanctions are aimed at helping society deal with future problems (e.g., future victims through
payments to the state’s victim compensation fund) and helping
42
to pay for continuing supervision.
Beyond their primary goals, these sanctions also have secondary purposes. Restitution can help with offender rehabilitation. Fines, forfeitures, and fees can serve to deter as well as to
punish. Costs can serve to punish as well as to restore equity
with society. Restitution, fines, and costs and fees are addressed in greater detail below.
A. RESTITUTION
Restitution refers to a court-ordered payment by the offender to compensate the victim for tangible financial losses diRESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 9 (Alfred Blumstein,
Jacqueline Cohen, Susan E. Martin & Michael H. Tonry eds., 1983).
41. See Philip Brickman, Crime and Punishment in Sports and Society, 33
J. SOC. ISSUES 140, 151–55 (1977).
42. See Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 248–49.
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43

rectly related to the crime. In contrast to pure punishment,
which to be effective at deterrence must be greater than the
44
harm caused, restitution is “exactly proportionate to the harm
45
caused by the offense.”
1. Rationale for Restitution
46

47

Going back to the Code of Hammurabi, Biblical law, and
48
the Middle Ages, victims’ injuries were to be compensated by
specified amounts of money. Although victims were entitled to
49
receive compensation in colonial America, by the early nineteenth century, and for more than one hundred years, the con50
cerns of victims were largely ignored. Following passage of the
Victim and Witness Protection Act in 1982, restitution was established at the federal level, and in 1996 became mandatory in
almost all federal cases as a result of the Mandatory Victims
51
Restitution Act. All states have statutory provisions that per52
mit restitution, the justification for these laws being their restorative effects on victims or their rehabilitative effects on of53
fenders.
Nationally, restitution is imposed on 18% of convicted fel54
ons. More specifically, other studies suggest that restitution
was ordered in 29% of the cases of felony probationers in 32
55
counties and in 63% of restitution-eligible cases in Pennsylva43. Id. at 249. It is particularly important that victims receive restitution
as quickly as possible. See, e.g., KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT:
FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 43 (2012).
44. See Brickman, supra note 41.
45. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES 4 (2007).
46. See Van Ness, supra note 16.
47. “If anyone sins and commits a breach of faith . . . through robbery, . . .
[he shall] restore what he took by robbery . . . he shall restore it in full and
shall add a fifth to it, and give it to him to whom it belongs.” Leviticus 6:1–5.
48. KLEIN, supra note 17.
49. Id. at 154.
50. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 153.
51. Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1688
(2009).
52. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 157.
53. See KLEIN, supra note 17, at 156–57.
54. MATTHEW DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT
SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, at 2004 tbl.1.9 (2007), available at http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04109tab.cfm.
55. MARK A. CUNNIFF & MARY K. SHILTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, VARIATIONS ON FELONY PROBATION: PERSONS UNDER
SUPERVISION IN 32 URBAN AND SUBURBAN COUNTIES 34 (1991), available at
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56

nia. Typically, restitution is handled by victim-focused agencies affiliated with the district attorney’s office (e.g., Victim/Witness Assistance Programs) or by offender-focused agen57
cies (e.g., probation/parole supervision). Generally, victims
and victim advocates have viewed restitution programs as unsuccessful because: (a) judges are often reluctant to impose restitution on offenders who, they assume, cannot pay it; (b) even
if restitution is imposed, the payment of restitution follows the
payment of other court-ordered obligations (e.g., costs and
fines); and (c) offenders often do not make restitution payments
because it is not clear who is responsible for monitoring, collect58
ing, disbursing, and enforcing restitution payments.
Although restitution is now victim-oriented, historically, it
59
was an offender-focused remedy that was intended to promote
the offender’s rehabilitation rather than to compensate the vic60
tim. Imposing, monitoring, and enforcing restitution orders is
expensive, sometimes costing more money than is likely to be
brought in. In the federal system, the cost of a single restitution
61
order is $2,000.
I am discussing restitution first because it demonstrates
the importance I think should be placed on victims. The crimi62
nal justice system is focused on offenders rather than victims.
By making restitution mandatory, my emphasis is on victims
63
rather than offenders. The problems usually faced by offenders are also faced by victims—they are disproportionately poor,
unemployed, unskilled, and racial/ethnic minorities. Victims
suffer both direct costs, such as lost or damaged property, medical expenses, lost wages, mental health counseling, and
drug/alcohol treatment, and indirect costs, such as purchasing
protection devices, paying increased insurance costs, moving,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/131580NCJRS.pdf.
56. Ruback & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 659.
57. See Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 250.
58. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 358.
59. Dickman, supra note 51, at 1702.
60. See id. at 1702–03 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court decisions that address justifications for restitution).
61. Id. at 1708.
62. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT,
VICTIMS OF CRIME IN AMERICA, at ii (1982), available at http://www.ovc.gov/
publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf.
63. Professor Bruce Benson takes this emphasis on victims’ rights to restitution to an extreme, arguing that the criminal justice system should be privatized so that the emphasis is on victim restitution rather than offender punishment. Bruce L. Benson, Decriminalisation, Restitution and Privatisation:
The Path to Reduced Violence and Theft, 21 GRIFFITH L. REV. 448 (2012).
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64

and avoiding certain neighborhoods. Tangible losses can cause
direct tangible harms (e.g., a stolen car), indirect tangible
harms (e.g., losing a job because of a lack of transportation),
and intangible harms (e.g., stress from financial worries). Receiving restitution can address not only issues of tangible
harms, but an order of restitution alone can also have some
“placebo value” because it gives victims the impression that
65
their concerns are being taken into account. The largest in66
tangible cost is generally pain and suffering, although there
are also intangible costs relating to reduced quality of life and
fear of crime. The most recent estimates of victims’ tangible
and intangible losses are $19,000 for robbery with injury,
67
$24,000 for an assault with injury, and $87,000 for rape.
In addition to the harms of physical injury (and the resulting medical and hospital charges), lost wages, and property
damage and loss, victims often suffer from the same sort of
credit, employment, and housing problems facing offenders,
which is not surprising because many victims are, have been,
68
or will be offenders. Victims also suffer increased chances of
69
revictimization through links between drug and alcohol use,
70
depression, and criminal offending.
64. See DEAN G. KILPATRICK, DAVID BEATTY & SUSAN SMITH HOWLEY,
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS—DOES LEGAL
PROTECTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 8–9 (1998), available at http://www
.cvactionalliance.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/
RightsofCrimeVictimslegalprotection.pdf.
65. See Anthony Walsh, Placebo Justice: Victim Recommendations and
Offender Sentences in Sexual Assault Cases, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1126, 1139–41 (1986).
66. See, e.g., LYNN LANGTON & JENNIFER TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SOCIO-EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF VIOLENT CRIME 1 (2013), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sivc.pdf (noting that about sixty-eight percent of victims of serious violent crime experience socioemotional problems as
a result of the crime); NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, MAKING
RESTITUTION REAL: FIVE CASE STUDIES ON IMPROVING RESTITUTION
COLLECTION 3–4 (2011) [hereinafter MAKING RESTITUTION REAL], available at
http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/2011-Natl-Center-forVictims-of-Crime-report.pdf.
67. MARK A. COHEN, THE COSTS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 42–43 (2005).
68. Cf. Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Deviant Lifestyles, Proximity to Crime, and the Offender-Victim Link in Personal Violence, 27 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 110, 113–14 (1990); JENNIFER N. SHAFFER & R. BARRY
RUBACK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION AS A RISK FACTOR
FOR VIOLENT OFFENDING AMONG JUVENILES 1–2 (2002), available at https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/195737.pdf.
69. See Maureen Outlaw, Barry Ruback & Chester Britt, Repeat and Multiple Victimizations: The Role of Individual and Contextual Factors, 17
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 187, 195–201 (2002).
70. R. Barry Ruback, Valerie A. Clark & Cody Warner, Why Are Crime
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Restitution addresses the tangible needs of victims by reimbursing them for the tangible costs incurred from the crime,
although restitution is not ordered in every case where it could
71
be imposed and restitution orders generally do not cover the
72
full costs of the harm suffered by victims. It legitimizes victims’ socioemotional needs by indicating, in an official and public manner, that their victimization was wrong and should be
73
repaired. Restitution may also address victims’ emotional
needs by holding offenders responsible for, and forcing them to
74
acknowledge, the harms they caused. Restitution cannot be
75
ordered for pain and suffering, but it can cover medical bills,
mental health counseling, replacement of lost or stolen proper76
ty, and funeral expenses.
Aside from addressing the needs of victims, many scholars
and practitioners alike support restitution because it forces offenders to confront the harms they caused victims, makes them
responsible for correcting those harms, and gives them a sense
77
of accomplishment when they have paid the restitution. Consistent with that notion, there is some suggestion in research
that victims prefer restitution from the offender over compensation from the state because restitution means that the of78
fender must acknowledge the harm that was inflicted. If those
goals are met, paying restitution is associated with lower rates

Victims at Risk of Being Victimized Again? Substance Use, Depression, and
Offending As Mediators of the Victimization-Revictimization Link, 29 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 157, 160–62 (2014).
71. As in the United States, restitution is generally not imposed in the
United Kingdom, occurring in less than one-third of burglary cases and less
than half of criminal damages cases. Miers, supra note 38, at 150.
72. Id. at 148.
73. Cf. MAKING RESTITUTION REAL, supra note 66, at 4.
74. See Tyler G. Okimoto & Tom R. Tyler, Is Compensation Enough? Relational Concerns in Responding to Unintended Inequity, 10 GROUP PROCESSES
& INTERGROUP REL. 399, 401 (2007).
75. For damages that are more difficult to quantify, like pain and suffering, civil court options are available. See NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
RESTITUTION (2004), available at http://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime
-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/restitution.
76. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 355.
77. MCGILLIS, supra note 22, at 13–19.
78. Miers, supra note 38, at 148 (citing Gordon Bazemore, Crime Victims,
Restorative Justice and the Juvenile Court: Exploring Victim Needs and Involvement in the Response to Youth Crime, 6 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 295
(1999); Daniela Bolivar, Conceptualizing Victims’ ‘Restoration’ in Restorative
Justice, 17 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 237 (2010); Jonathan Doak & David
O’Mahony, The Vengeful Victim? Assessing the Attitudes of Victims Participating in Restorative Youth Conferencing, 13 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 157 (2006).
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of recidivism for both adult offenders and juvenile offenders.
Unfortunately, analyses of recidivism generally look only at
gross categories of interventions (e.g., probation, intensive probation, jail, prison) rather than at specific types of sanctions,
81
such as economic sanctions. There are only a few studies examining the relationship between the payment of restitution
and recidivism, and their value is limited by relatively small
sample sizes and potential problems of omitted variable bias
82
and reverse causality.
Unaddressed by restitution, but illustrative of the fact that
crime has many repercussions for victims, are the indirect
harms to the community caused by the links between poverty
and crime. Poor communities suffer broken windows that cannot be repaired because of the expense, and there have been
83
claims that broken windows lead to crime, although the re84
search is not definitive. Moreover, communities that have
high rates of crime are those where people who are able to will
move out, leaving only those who, because they are too poor,
85
who cannot leave the community. High rates of mobility into
79. Joe Heinz, Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson, Restitution or Parole: A Follow-Up Study of Adult Offenders, 50 SOC. SERV. REV. 148, 152–54 (1976);
Maureen C. Outlaw & R. Barry Ruback, Predictors and Outcomes of Victim
Restitution Orders, 16 JUSTICE Q. 847, 850–52 (1999).
80. David P. Farrington & Brandon C. Welsh, Randomized Experiments
in Criminology: What Have We Learned in the Last Two Decades? 1 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 9, 29–30 (2005); Stacy Hoskins Haynes, Alison
C. Cares & R. Barry Ruback, Juvenile Economic Sanctions: An Analysis of
Their Imposition, Payment, and Effect on Recidivism, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 31, 51–52 (2014); Anne L. Schneider, Restitution and Recidivism Rates
of Juvenile Offenders: Results from Four Experimental Studies, 24
CRIMINOLOGY 533, 549–51 (1986).
81. Joshua C. Cochran, Daniel P. Mears & William D. Bales, Assessing the
Effectiveness of Correctional Sanctions, 30 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
317, 318 (2014).
82. See, e.g., Outlaw & Ruback, supra note 79, at 861–63.
83. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police
and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 1982), http://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465.
84. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of
the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory,
and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 308–
42 (1998); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q., 319, 336–37 (2004).
85. See R. BARRY RUBACK & MARTIE P. THOMPSON, SOCIAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION 168–69 (2001);
see also Laura Dugan, The Effect of Criminal Victimization on a Household's
Moving Decision, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 903, 922–24 (1999) (noting an increase in a
household’s probability of moving “after any of its members are victimized”).
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and out of the community undermine community cohesion, and
86
this social disorganization can lead to crime.
2. Current Status of Restitution in the States
States differ in their support of victims’ rights regarding
restitution. An examination of the laws concerning restitution
for all fifty states and the District of Columbia, using the
VictimLaw searchable database maintained by the Office for
87
Victims of Crime, indicates that twenty states give victims a
88
constitutional right to restitution. Thirty-three states make
restitution mandatory (e.g., using “shall” rather than “may”),
but three of those states (Connecticut, Idaho, and North Dako89
ta) introduce qualifications to mandatory restitution. Six
states prohibit judges from considering the defendant’s ability
to pay when imposing restitution, thus making restitution dependent on the victim’s actual losses rather than on the defendant’s present and future assets and wages—symbolically
90
placing the victim’s interests above those of the defendant.
Twenty-three states explicitly indicate that judges can consider
the defendant’s financial resources, in some cases stating that
the judge must consider the impact of paying restitution on the
91
defendant and the defendant’s dependents. Twenty-one states
do not have a law that addresses the issue of whether the judge
is to consider the defendant’s ability to pay, meaning that the
92
judge can consider the defendant’s ability to pay.
Even among the states that have mandatory restitution
statutes, there is inconsistency in that some states require restitution only for violent crimes whereas others require restitu-

86. Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and
Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. SOC. 774, 799–800
(1989).
87. Office of Justice Programs, VICTIMLAW, https://www.victimlaw.org/
victimlaw/start.do (follow “Search by topic”; select “Right to restitution”; select
“Court authority to order restitution”; select “Federal” and “State and Territories”; select “States and regulatory provisions”; select “Select all”; then search
for results). The laws listed in the database are current as of 2011.
88. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 157. VictimLaw gives the number as 18, but I agree with Tobolowsky and my own reading of the constitutions of Montana and Virginia. See VICTIMLAW, supra note 87.
89. See VICTIMLAW, supra note 87; cf. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 10,
at 157.
90. See VICTIMLAW, supra note 87; cf. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 10,
at 157–58.
91. See VICTIMLAW, supra note 87.
92. See id.
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93

tion only for property crimes. There are also differences
among the states in terms of who can receive restitution. In
some states, only the victim can receive restitution, but in other
states, family members and victims’ estates, as well as agencies
that provide assistance to victims (e.g., victim service agencies,
94
compensation programs), can receive restitution. Further differences among states arise in terms of whether indirect victims (e.g., insurance companies) and local governments are en95
titled to restitution. In some states, incarcerated offenders
must pay restitution, whereas in others offenders must be on
96
probation or parole. States also differ in terms of whether ju97
veniles are obligated to pay restitution.
Most defendants have few financial resources, meaning
that it is unlikely victims will receive the restitution they are
owed or that state and local governments will receive the fines,
98
fees, and costs that were imposed. Eleven states require that
restitution be paid before other economic sanctions, meaning
that, if any payments are made, the victim, rather than the
99
state or local government, will receive it. Fourteen states have
laws that automatically convert restitution orders into civil
judgments, and eight states have a law whereby a restitution
order permits the seizure of assets or property or the attach100
ment of wages.
3. Imposition and Payment of Restitution
The Office for Victims of Crime has recommended manda101
tory restitution. This requirement of mandatory restitution is
easier to defend for some victims than others. In particular,
some judges are reluctant to require restitution for businesses
102
and especially insurance companies. The ABA Victims Committee also recommended that “[t]he offender’s ability to pay
should not determine whether the offender will be sentenced to
103
restitution,” although the court can consider ability to pay “in
93. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 356–57.
94. Id. at 357.
95. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 170.
96. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 357.
97. Id.
98. See Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 243, 264.
99. See VICTIMLAW, supra note 87.
100. Id.
101. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 364.
102. Ruback & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 664.
103. Victims Comm., Restitution for Crime Victims: A National Strategy,
2004 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUSTICE 15.
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fashioning the mode and schedule of payment.” Under federal
law and the law of many states, however, the court must con105
sider the defendant’s financial resources.
Case factors and offender characteristics are the best pre106
dictors of whether restitution will be imposed. Beyond that,
one of the strongest predictors of receiving an order of restitu107
tion is the ease with which damages can be quantified. Rationally, longer criminal records should be related to larger
amounts of economic sanctions because offenders who have
committed crimes despite having been punished before should
be punished more and require more deterrence. However, there
is evidence that offenders with longer criminal records are likely to receive significantly lower economic sanctions, even controlling for whether the offender was sentenced to a term of in108
carceration.
It seems that judges believe offenders with
longer records are less likely to pay any economic sanctions imposed, and therefore, judges simply do not impose them. The
finding that individuals who were sentenced to prison were
significantly less likely to have mandatory economic sanctions
imposed is consistent with the finding of Harris et al., who used
national data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and found
that probationers and misdemeanants were more likely than
109
prisoners to have economic sanctions imposed.
Typically, when an offender makes a payment (to the clerk
of courts or the probation office), some money is forwarded to
the victim, depending on legal and jurisdictional practical factors such as whether restitution is paid before other economic
sanctions and how restitution is divided among multiple victims. For example, a study found that in one county in Pennsylvania, victims from older convictions were paid first, but in
another county, payments were evenly divided across all vic-

104. Id. at 17.
105. Id. at 16.
106. See Outlaw & Ruback, supra note 79, at 849–50; cf. R. Barry Ruback,
Jennifer N. Shaffer & Melissa A. Logue, The Imposition and Effects of Restitution in Four Pennsylvania Counties: Effects of Size of County and Specialized
Collection Units, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 168, 171–74 (2004).
107. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORDERING
RESTITUTION TO THE CRIME VICTIM 5 (2002), available at https://www.ncjrs
.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin6/ncj189189.pdf;
Outlaw
&
Ruback, supra note 79, at 857; Ruback, Shaffer & Logue, supra note 106, at
182.
108. See R. Barry Ruback & Valerie Clark, Economic Sanctions in Pennsylvania: Complex and Inconsistent, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 751, 768–70 (2011).
109. Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1769–71.
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tims, regardless of when the conviction occurred. The study
also found that in most counties, individual victims were paid
before business victims, state victims, or insurance compa111
nies. Although Pennsylvania law requires that the first fifty
percent of all offender payments be applied to restitution and
that other economic sanctions (e.g., fines, fees, costs) be paid after that, some counties required that one hundred percent of
112
payments be applied to restitution until it is paid in full. At
the other extreme, one county, counter to the law, required that
supervision fees and DUI course instructors be paid before res113
titution. Aside from policy disagreements, judges might not
110. R. BARRY RUBACK, ALISON C. CARES & STACY N. HOSKINS,
EVALUATION OF BEST PRACTICES IN RESTITUTION AND VICTIM COMPENSATION
ORDERS AND PAYMENTS 119–20 (2006) [hereinafter RUBACK ET AL.,
EVALUATION], available at http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/
research-and-evaluation-reports/special-reports/act-37-of-2007-economic
-sanctions/special-report-evaluation-of-best-practices-in-restitution-andvictim-compensation-orders-and-payments/view.
111. With regard to the type of victim for which restitution is appropriate,
judges’ responses were consistent with the statute, in that individuals and
businesses were ranked higher than the Victim Compensation Board and insurance companies were ranked very low. See id. at 158, 170, 187. Indeed,
some judges were not willing to order restitution for insurance companies. See
id. at 153, 178. In general, however, the ranking of victims was consistent
with the remarks of one judge who said,
Although I order restitution in every case where it is claimed, I believe it is far more important that an individual, rather than a corporate entity, is made whole. Such losses are a part of doing business.
For insurance companies, I do not see an insured getting a rebate because a defendant reimbursed the company.
R. BARRY RUBACK, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA: A MULTIMETHOD
INVESTIGATION 58 (2002) [hereinafter RUBACK, RESTITUTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA]. “There was also an indication that judges found some systemrelated enforcement difficulties to be problematic, although not as problematic
as offender problems.” Ruback & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 664. Restitution also
was not imposed at higher rates due to disagreements over the statute.
Although judges, prosecutors, and probation officers all agreed
that the primary goal of restitution is victim compensation, they also
said that it serves both to rehabilitate and punish the offender. Given
that punishment is not supposed to be a goal of restitution but that
decision makers believe that in fact it is, they may be inclined to
avoid imposing restitution in order to avoid punishing the offender
further. Consistent with this explanation for why restitution was not
imposed in all situations where it might have been, one judge wrote
the following on his survey: “Many judges give stiff sentences in lieu
of restitution, less stiff sentences if restitution is ordered. This practice is incompatible to the given situation and dissatisfies the victims
and breaks down the reasons for restitution and its effective collection.”
RUBACK, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra at 57.
112. RUBACK ET AL., EVALUATION, supra note 110, at 119.
113. See id. at 168–69. If the offender made a large payment, fifty percent
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impose restitution in all cases because of practical limitations
on the system’s ability to collect it. Or, as one judge from a
large city put it:
I hear only major crimes where 90+% of the time the offenders are indigent. You can’t get blood out of a stone. When you have rapes, aggravated assaults, gun-point robberies [by] those with no skills [and]
who have never held a job, what good is restitution? They will be in
jail for five to ten years and have no assets. It’s the exception, not the
114
rule, in the major cases in a large city.

For offenders who do not make restitution payments,
courts can extend probation, revoke probation, hold them in
contempt, and, if there is no showing of inability to pay, incar115
cerate. However, data suggests that judges only infrequently
put offenders in jail for nonpayment of restitution and even
more rarely when that nonpayment is the only violation of pro116
bation.
Studies repeatedly find that victims do not receive full restitution for their losses because it is not imposed; and if imposed, the imposed amounts either do not cover victims’ losses
117
or, even if imposed in full, are not paid. In one study, only
43% of victims said that the amount of restitution ordered cov118
ered their losses, and another study reported that only 18% of
victims believed the court took their estimation of losses into
119
account when setting the restitution amount. Vermont’s Res120
titution Unit has an overall collection rate of only 24%. A
study of six Pennsylvania counties found that two to four years
after conviction, the average percentage of restitution paid
121
ranged from 34% to 74%, and a survey of victims in two of
was applied to restitution; because DUI courses are expensive (i.e., $250 or
more) and supervision fees are about $35 a month, large payments were uncommon. In non-DUI cases, the county was in compliance with the law. See
generally id. app. F at 167–76.
114. RUBACK, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 111, at 58.
115. Victims Comm., supra note 103, at 27–34.
116. R. Barry Ruback, The Abolition of Fines and Fees: Not Proven and Not
Compelling, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 569, 574–75 (2011) [hereinafter
Ruback, Abolition].
117. Cf. Victims Comm., supra note 103, at 1–3. The Committee suggested
that restitution payments could be increased if more aggressive tactics were
adopted, “including income garnishments, property liens, intercepting income
tax refunds, reporting debts to credit agencies, ‘booting’ cars, suspension of
driving and other licenses and ‘most wanted’ lists.” Id. at 3.
118. Robert C. Davis, Barbara Smith & Susan Hillenbrand, Restitution:
The Victim’s Viewpoint, 15 JUSTICE SYS. J. 746, 754 tbl. 1 (1992).
119. RUBACK ET AL., EVALUATION, supra note 110, at 213 tbl.K-1.
120. MAKING RESTITUTION REAL, supra note 66, at 42.
121. RUBACK ET AL., EVALUATION, supra note 110, at 45.
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those six counties found that only 24% had received full restitution, 28% had received partial restitution, and 48% had re122
ceived no restitution. Finally, even if the restitution is paid,
victims are not likely to receive it when they most need it. One
study found that only 37% of victims were satisfied with the
123
timeliness of restitution.
Victims are generally not kept informed about the restitu124
tion process, and they generally do not understand the pro125
cess. Moreover, there is a real concern that “[f]or many victims restitution becomes a hollow promise” because it is
126
unlikely to be paid. And, if victims are dissatisfied with the
restitution process, they may experience it within a second victimization and be less likely to cooperate with the criminal jus127
tice system in the future.
Rather than think of restitution as a penalty, it is possible
to consider it as a restorative justice procedure. Restorative justice practices assume that the justice process is about repairing
the harm from a crime in a way that balances the needs of the
128
victim, the community, and the offender. Restorative justice
includes both a formal process, administered by the government and focused on accountability and reparation, and an informal process, administered by the community, which treats
the victim with respect and attempts to reintegrate the offend129
er into the community.
Research suggests that rates of restitution payment may
be higher in restorative justice programs than traditional criminal justice programs, although the research is limited by selection bias problems (e.g., only some subgroups of offenders and

122. R. Barry Ruback, Alison C. Cares & Stacy N. Hoskins, Crime Victims’
Perceptions of Restitution: The Importance of Payment and Understanding, 23
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 697, 704 (2008) [hereinafter Ruback et al., Perceptions].
123. Davis et al., supra note 118, at 752.
124. See id. at 752 (finding that only nineteen percent of victims in the
study believed they were well-informed about restitution); see also Ruback et
al., Perceptions, supra note 122, at 705 (making a similar finding regarding a
lack of information).
125. Davis et al., supra note 118, at 705 (finding that on a seven-point scale
of how well victims understood the restitution process, the mean was below
the midpoint).
126. Id. at 746.
127. Ruback, et al., Perceptions, supra note 122, at 708.
128. Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court: Retributive or Restorative Responses to Youth Crime, 41
CRIME & DELINQ. 296, 302 (1995); Van Ness, supra note 1646, at 9.
129. Van Ness, supra note 16, at 12.
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130

victims can participate in the program). Victims may benefit
from these programs because they receive informational support (i.e., they learn of the rights and services available to victims), emotional support (i.e., the harms they suffered are
acknowledged, and they have an opportunity to be heard), and
tangible support (i.e., restitution). Thus, from a victim’s perspective, restorative justice programs may be better than resti131
tution alone.
The Restitution in Pennsylvania Task Force made several
suggestions about how to ensure that victims are awarded res132
titution and that offenders pay the amounts ordered.
To
make it easier for judges to understand the law and to issue
restitution orders, the Task Force suggested that the state clarify and standardize policies regarding the imposition of restitu133
tion. In addition, the Task Force suggested that there be the
134
possibility of sanctions for nonpayment of restitution. The
Task Force also recommended that victims be provided with
more information about what restitution is and how it is imposed, collected, and distributed, and that, to make it easier to
locate victims, a web-based system be established so that victims could update their contact information relating to the res135
titution order.
A recent experiment suggests that there can be costeffective ways for probation officers to induce offenders to pay
136
the restitution they owe. The study suggests that informing
130. Jeff Latimer, Craig Dowden & Danielle Muise, The Effectiveness of
Restorative Justice Practices: A Meta-Analysis, 85 PRISON J. 127, 137 (2005).
131. See generally Haynes et al., supra note 80.
132. PA. OFFICE OF THE VICTIM ADVOCATE, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA
TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, (Feb. 2013), http://www.center-school.org/
Restitution/pdf/Restitution_Taskforce_Full_Report.pdf.
133. Id. at 7–8.
134. The Task Force suggested such actions as suspending state driver’s
licenses for offenders who do not pay, mandating Clerks of Court to file civil
judgments when a case balance exceeds $1,000, increasing means to collect
restitution by directly taking money from the offender (e.g., attaching wages
and/or attaching IRS refunds), and inducing the offender to pay through
threats to restrict travel, limit eligibility for public assistance, and file contempt of court proceedings. Id. at 35.
135. Id. at 8–9.
136. R. Barry Ruback, Andrew Gladfelter & Brendan Lantz, Paying Restitution: Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Information and Rationale, 13
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 405 (2014). In the experiment, “offenders were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 x 2 between-subjects design
in which, over a six-month period, three-quarters of the offenders received
monthly letters that contained (a) information or no information about the
economic sanctions they had paid and what they still owed (Information manipulation) and (b) a statement or no statement about reasons for paying resti-
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offenders on a regular basis about how much restitution they
have paid and how much they still owe can lead them to pay
more restitution and to make more monthly payments—effects
that were interpreted as being due primarily to a change in internal motivation—consistent with the rationale for restorative
137
justice. Although the question of the generalizability of the
procedure remains open, the results of this experiment suggest
that, at relatively little cost (because information about payments was gathered from individuals’ court dockets publicly
available on the web), governments can increase restitution
payments, benefiting victims, society, and perhaps the offenders themselves.
B. FINES
Fines are monetary penalties for crime. Nationally, they
138
are imposed on thirty-three percent of convicted felons. Fines
can be used as the sole sanction or in combination with other
139
sanctions, from treatment to incarceration. In some jurisdictions, fines are used as prosecution diversion devices, such that
140
charges are dismissed when the fines are paid. Fines can also
be targeted to support specific purposes. For example, most
fines in the federal system are deposited in the Crime Victims
Fund, ninety percent of which is sent to the states for victim
141
compensation and assistance.
142
In contrast to the assumption of the Model Penal Code,
many scholars believe economic sanctions have strengths, that
is, have some penological value. First, there is some evidence
tution (Rationale manipulation). The remaining offenders did not receive a letter.” Over a one-year period (the six months of letters and a six-month followup period), “offenders who had received letters containing information . . . paid
significantly more money and made significantly more monthly payments
than did offenders in the other three experimental conditions. A costeffectiveness analysis indicated that for every dollar spent on the experimental manipulation, about $6.44 in restitution was received.” Id. at 405.
137. Ruback, Gladfelter, and Lantz reasoned that “if it were fear of being
monitored that led to the increased payments, then the absence of monitoring
(i.e., no letters for six months) should have reduced that fear, meaning that
payments should have been reduced[, and t]hey were not.” Id. at 406.
138. DUROSE, supra note 54.
139. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 61–62.
140. Tonry & Lynch, supra note 7, at 128 (discussing the use of fines as
prosecution diversion devices in Europe).
141. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-99-70, FEDERAL COURTS:
DIFFERENCES EXIST IN ORDERING FINES AND RESTITUTION 1 (1999). In Pennsylvania, fines are also used to support a Crime Victim Compensation Fund.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11.1101(b)(1) (2014).
142. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (2014).
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that, compared with incarceration, fines are about as effective
143
at deterring future crime but are substantially cheaper be144
cause the state does not have to pay for housing. Moreover,
fines can avoid some of the stigma and secondary effects of incarceration, such as loss of employment and unsupported dependents, who would otherwise have to rely on public assis145
tance. Second, compared with simple probation, fines are
more punitive and thus can serve as intermediate sanctions be146
tween probation and prison. Third, fines can be flexible, in
that they can be adjusted to the facts of the case and the cir147
cumstances of the offender. Moreover, they can be used alone,
with incarceration, with probation, or with both incarceration
148
and probation. Fourth, evaluating the success of fines is relatively easy and straightforward, and is usually determined by
an offender’s level of payment.
149
Fines have been criticized for not being rehabilitative,
but the alternative—short periods of incarceration—is also non150
rehabilitative. Doing away with fines makes incarceration
more likely since there would be fewer intermediate sanctions
151
available.
In the United States, many people oppose the use of fines
152
because they cannot be enforced against the poor and have
153
little impact on the wealthy. Fines with absolute maximums
143. Margaret A. Gordon & Daniel Glaser, The Use and Effects of Financial
Penalties in Municipal Courts, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 651, 672 (1991).
144. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND
PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING
SYSTEM 157 (1990) (analyzing the costs of incarceration).
145. Gordon & Glaser, supra note 143, at 651–52.
146. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
147. HILLSMAN ET AL., FINES AS SANCTIONS, supra note 20, at 2.
148. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 61–62.
149. E.g., Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction:
Monetary Sanctions As Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509,
519 (2011).
150. Pat O’Malley, Politicizing the Case for Fines, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 547, 548–49 (2011) (“Fines and short-term imprisonment thus both
seemed to be noncorrectional punishments, and fines were less disruptive and
possibly less criminogenic.”).
151. Id. at 550; see also Ruback, Abolition, supra note 116, at 577 (“[O]ne
goal we might want to have [if fines were to be abolished] is to increase the
number of intermediate sanctions.”).
152. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (holding that judges
cannot impose incarceration as a penalty for nonpayment unless there is a
hearing that determines that the defendant has the ability to pay, but willfully
refuses to do so).
153. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 53–54. In contrast, in Europe, fines are the
legally presumptive penalty, constituting, for example, eighty to ninety per-
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can become ineffective if legislatures do not regularly update
154
them to adjust for inflation. Fines that have a statutorily defined and predetermined amount are regressive and do not
meet the goals of individualized justice. Thus, fines in the
United States tend to be used primarily in courts of limited ju155
risdiction, particularly traffic courts. Fines are also used in
lower courts for minor offenses, such as shoplifting, especially
for first-time offenders who have enough money to pay the fi156
ne. In the United States, fines are used in forty-two percent
of courts of general jurisdiction and eighty-six percent of cases
157
in courts of limited jurisdiction.
For each jurisdiction there is usually a “going rate” for
fines, that is, what is typically imposed for a particular of158
fense. Because judges tend to use this going rate for fines,
they do not adjust the seriousness of the penalty to the particu159
lar defendant. And, because this going rate is usually low (in
order to accommodate the poorest offenders), for wealthy of160
fenders, fines often have little punitive value. Rather than
make adjustments at initial sentencing, judges tend to make
adjustments to fines at the back end, when they often excuse
cent of all sentences in Germany and Sweden. Tonry & Lynch, supra note 7, at
128; FED. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR & FED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FIRST
PERIODICAL REPORT ON CRIME AND CRIME CONTROL IN GERMANY 33 (2001).
Criminal fines were imposed in about eighty percent of cases in England and
Wales in 1989. DAVID MOXON, MIKE SUTTON & CAROL HEDDERMAN, UNIT
FINES: EXPERIMENTS IN FOUR COURTS 1 (1990). One type of fine commonly
used in Europe is the day fine, which is based on the severity of the crime and
the offender’s ability to pay (typically, the offender’s daily income). Hillsman,
supra note 2, at 76. A second type of fine common in Europe is a method to divert the offender from criminal justice processing. Tonry & Lynch, supra note
7, at 128. If the defendant agrees to pay the fine (typically, the amount that
would have been imposed had the defendant been convicted), charges are conditionally dismissed. Id.
154. See Robert W. Gillespie, Criminal Fines: Do They Pay?, 13 JUST. SYS.
J. 365, 370 (1988–89) (discussing the impact of changes to the maximum fine
imposed in drug cases).
155. SALLY T. HILLSMAN, JOYCE L. SICHEL & BARRY MAHONEY, FINES IN
SENTENCING: A STUDY OF THE USE OF THE FINE AS A CRIMINAL SANCTION 2
(1984).
156. HILLSMAN ET AL., FINES AS SANCTIONS, supra note 20, at 2–3.
157. David Weisburd, Tomer Einat & Matt Kowalski, The Miracle of the
Cells: An Experimental Study of Interventions To Increase Payment of CourtOrdered Financial Obligations, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 9, 12 (2008).
158. Sally T. Hillsman & Judith A. Greene, The Use of Fines As an Intermediate Sanction, in SMART SENTENCING: THE EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIATE
SANCTIONS 123, 127 (James M. Byrne, Arthur J. Lurigio & Joan Petersilia
eds., 1992).
159. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 63.
160. Id.
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the remaining unpaid portion or simply let the probation period
expire without enforcing the fine.
In the late eighteenth century, there was a shift away from
fines because imprisonment’s effect on liberty was seen as a
161
fairer punishment. A second reason was that imprisonment
was the likely result for individuals who defaulted on their
162
fines. Although Bentham argued for fines that took into account the offender’s wealth, European countries in the nineteenth century generally opposed the notion because of a reluctance to thoroughly investigate the offender’s assets and a
163
concern that punishment should be equal.
Most countries use fines, which, according to Bentham,
have several clear advantages: “they were cheap to administer,
produced revenues, could be completely undone in the event of
a wrongful conviction being established, could be graduated infinitely to match the magnitude of the wrong, could be matched
to the means of the offender . . . and could be used to provide
164
victim compensation.”
Fines are the legally presumptive penalty in many Euro165
pean countries and thus are much more common there. In
Germany, for example, eighty percent of convicted offenders are
166
ordered to pay a fine, and fines are imposed in about eighty
167
percent of criminal cases in England and Wales. Many of these fines in Europe are day fines, which are based on the severity of the crime and the offender’s ability to pay (typically, the
168
offender’s daily income). Fines in Europe are usually the sole
sanction, whereas in the United States they are additional
169
penalties.
In the short term, improving knowledge about assets and
income to inform the imposition of fines is a good idea. Judges,
prosecuting attorneys, probation officers, and victims will have
better ideas about the capability of the offender to pay the re161. Patricia Faraldo-Cabana, Towards Equalisation of the Impact of the
Penal Fine: Why the Wealth of the Offender Was Taken into Account, 3 INT’L J.
FOR CRIME, JUST. & SOC. DEMOCRACY 3, 4 (2014).
162. Id. at 5.
163. Id. at 6.
164. O’Malley, supra note 150, at 550.
165. Tonry & Lynch, supra note 7, at 128 (finding that fines are the presumptive penalty in Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands).
166. FED. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR & FED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra
note 153, at 33.
167. MOXON ET AL., supra note 153, at 1.
168. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 75–76.
169. Id. at 49–50.
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quired costs. The knowledge might also help offenders, for
whom the information might be useful for managing their money.
C. COSTS AND FEES
Costs and fees refer to court-imposed orders to reimburse
the jurisdiction (local, county, or state) for the administrative
cost of operating the criminal justice system. One way that the
terms “costs” and “fees” have been differentiated is that costs
describe blanket charges for program admission or participation, whereas fees refer to specific, individual charges for ser170
vices. In Pennsylvania, for example, there are costs for the
court-processing expenses associated with a court diversion
171
172
program and a fee to pay for DNA analysis. In other jurisdictions, costs are backward-looking charges for the costs of
prosecution, whereas fees are forward-looking charges for fu173
ture expenses (e.g., probation supervision).
However, the
terms are often used interchangeably, and that is how they are
used in the Model Penal Code and this Article.
Supervision fees, which are the most common type of spe174
cial condition on probation, help defray the costs of preparing
presentence reports and supervising probationers. In some jurisdictions, probation departments are self-supported by these
175
supervision fees. Such fees are also a necessity in jurisdictions where correctional budgets do not cover the costs of su176
pervision. Special services, such as electronic monitoring, re177
quire additional fees.
There are a large number of costs and fees imposed, and
178
most economic sanctions in the United States are fees. In
Pennsylvania, for example, each year there are about 2.8 million economic sanctions from more than 2,600 different categories imposed across all offenders, most of which are costs and
179
fees. There is significant variation between counties both in
170. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 253.
171. Id. at 253–54.
172. Id.
173. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
174. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS
OF ADULTS ON PROBATION, 1995, at 6 (1997).
175. Olson & Ramker, supra note 6, at 30.
176. See Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST.
149, 171–73 (1997) (discussing the inadequacies in probation funding).
177. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 254.
178. O’Malley, supra note 150, at 548.
179. Ruback & Clark, supra note 108, at 770.
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the number of different types of economic sanctions imposed
(and the resulting complexity of the system of economic sanctions), and in the average and median amounts of economic
sanctions imposed per case. In general, counties with larger
populations and higher percentages of citizens in urban areas
impose more, and a greater variety of, economic sanctions.
Aside from county-level differences, there are also significant offender-level differences. Most importantly, there are differences between individual offenders based on conviction offense. In Pennsylvania, DUI offenders have much higher
economic sanctions imposed than drug, person, and property
offenders because they are likely to pay fees in order both to regain their driver’s license and, if they had been admitted to a
diversionary program, to avoid the stigma of a criminal rec180
ord. But, in general, fees are likely counterproductive—what
O’Malley calls “economically irrational”—because they cost
181
more to implement than the money that is brought in. Moreover, the use of fees can interfere with other economic sanctions. “Fees cannot substitute for imprisonment, but fines can;
fees, unlike fines, are a comparatively recent invention; and
one reason why so many Americans are imprisoned is because
182
fines are used so infrequently.”
In this Part, I reviewed three major types of economic
sanctions: restitution, fines, and costs and fees. Although each
type can serve multiple purposes, restitution is aimed primarily
at restoring the victim, fines are aimed primarily at punishing
the offender, and costs and fees are aimed primarily at covering
some of the expenses of the criminal justice system. Conceptually, these three types of sanctions are relatively clear, but
practical issues can make implementation difficult.
III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS
The prior Part defined and discussed economic sanctions in
the abstract. This Part focuses on problems of implementation.
Three practical problems are discussed: determining the offender’s ability to pay; assessing the tradeoffs between the
three types of economic sanctions; and, especially for restitution, deciding on the order for payment across and within cases.

180. Id. at 767.
181. O’Malley, supra note 150, at 551.
182. Id. at 548.
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A. ABILITY TO PAY
Economic sanctions, despite the advantages discussed earlier, have several downsides, the primary one being that many
offenders have limited assets and incomes and may not be able
183
to pay completely the economic sanctions that are ordered.
Thus, when setting the amount of economic sanctions, judges
may need to consider the offender’s ability to pay so that the
amount set will be realistic in terms of what the offender will
actually pay and the payment schedule that is set is more likely
to be adhered to. Moreover, if the offender perceives the economic sanctions as so high as to be impossible to pay, he or she
is likely to perceive the system as unfair and illegitimate, and,
184
as a result, to simply give up attempting to pay.
In contrast, the primary reason not to consider the offender’s ability to pay when setting the amount of economic sanctions is that a failure to impose the economic sanction means
that the system considers the offender’s (and the offender’s
family’s) needs to be greater than those of the victim or society.
Specifically with reference to restitution, not to impose the
money devalues the victim and victims generally, perhaps increasing the victim’s psychological distress and making the victim less likely to cooperate with the criminal justice system in
the future. Second, looking at the defendant’s ability to pay
gives the defendant the impression that he or she can get
around the system. Third, the defendant may at some point
gain the money to pay the restitution (e.g., through inheritance,
winning the lottery, tax refund, or recovery in a lawsuit), and
unless the sanction was imposed, recovery is essentially impossible. There are also issues of hidden income, especially illegal
income.
One of the basic issues relating to economic sanctions is
how a court determines an offender’s ability to pay. Most courts
do not have a written plan for how such a determination should
185
be made. Courts in Europe can use actual earnings as the ba183. See Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1786 (describing offenders’ inability
to pay legal debt quickly enough to avoid long term liability).
184. See id. at 1780 (“The fact that legal debt often grew despite regular
payments led some [offenders] to feel so frustrated they eventually stopped
paying.”).
185. For example, the city of Montgomery, Alabama was ordered to “submit
a plan detailing how it intends to assess a debtor’s ability to pay, and what
alternatives to jail, such as community service, it will provide the indigent.”
Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc.: Does the Alternatives-to-Incarceration
Industry Profit from Injustice?, NEW YORKER, June 23, 2014, at 48, 61. A settlement between the city of Montgomery and the Southern Poverty Law Cen-
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sis for imposing economic sanctions, but many governments
there have access to more information about people than the
186
United States government (e.g., income and tax records). Accurately determining the ability to pay requires that kind of detailed information—tax records, links to the IRS and state
agencies, listings of all bank accounts, and property owned by
relatives, to detect property that could have been transferred to
avoid payment—that judges in the United States currently do
187
not have available to them. Linking imposed economic sanctions to ability to pay will require more detailed, and expensive,
presentence investigations and the legal authority for probation
officers to find out detailed information about salaries and all
assets, including assets that are jointly held.
In Europe, courts have access to virtually all information
about assets and income. In the United States, by contrast,
courts do not have that information. Maricopa County (Phoe188
nix) has a full survey that probationers must complete. Although “ability to pay” on its face seems straightforward, in implementation it can be problematic because offenders’ work can
be irregular and their monetary obligations (e.g., child support,
formal or informal loans) can change, thus necessitating con189
tinual monitoring.
ter was announced on August 26, 2014 and is awaiting final approval from the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama Northern Division.
SPLC Lawsuit Closes Debtors’ Prison in Alabama Capital, S. POVERTY L.
CNTR. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/splc
-lawsuit-closes-debtors-prison-in-alabama-capital. That courts are unable to
know offenders’ ability to pay is also problematic in the United Kingdom, such
that judges are unable to accurately set fines and restitution. Miers, supra
note 38, at 147 (citing MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT AND REFORM:
EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY SENTENCES, 2012, Cm. 8469 (U.K.)).
186. See Hillsman, supra note 2, at 80 (explaining that Swedish courts
have “access to income and tax records”).
187. Ruback, Abolition, supra note 116, at 576–77.
188. Maricopa County Adult Probation Department, Payment Ability
Evaluation, available at https://www.victimsofcrime.org/docs/restitution
-toolkit/d3_payment-ability-eval-worksheet.pdf. The Maricopa County survey
is a detailed eight-page form that asks for information about (a) eleven types
of assets for the offender and for the offender’s spouse, (b) twenty-three
sources of income for the offender and for the offender’s spouse and (c) sixtyfour different monthly expenses. Id. There is also a self-employed income supplement. Id. Verification is required for all of the information. In Maricopa
County, offenders are required to complete the form only if they have been delinquent in payments. See RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON,
REPAYING DEBTS 36 (2007), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
media/publications/bja_repaying_debts_guide_2006.pdf (explaining that the
form must be completed when a payment is 30 days delinquent).
189. Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Mitali Nagrecha, A New Punishment Regime, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 555, 564–65 (2011).

2015]

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1807

Inability to pay debt is a problem that goes beyond criminal sanctions, as there are real problems today with student
190
191
debt, consumer debt, and child support. Given these multiple debts faced by the general population, and especially by offenders facing economic and other criminal justice sanctions,
there is a need to address these problems in a more integrated
192
fashion.
For offenders, making payments of economic sanctions requires both ability and motivation. Regarding ability, offenders
everywhere argue that they are not able to make payments. For
example, in two surveys in Pennsylvania, Ruback and colleagues found that offenders report that it would be very diffi193
cult for them to make payments. Similarly, Harris et al.’s interviews with offenders indicate that economic sanctions strain
194
offenders’ ability to meet other needs.
However, offenders’ claims may need to be discounted
somewhat. The National Center for State Courts conducted a
survey of forty courts to determine what practices might work
195
to increase economic sanction collections.
Although many
judges and court managers said they believed that offenders
did not have the ability to pay fines and fees, the report also
found that “experienced collectors consistently assert that all
but a very few defendants have greater resources for meeting
196
their obligations than might be immediately apparent.” Similarly, Weisburd et al. found that offenders will make payments
if they are threatened with probation revocation for nonpay-

190. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Welcome to Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edition, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748704396504576204553811636610 (calling attention to the
practice of arresting and jailing consumer debtors for failure to pay).
191. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (involving a South Carolina man jailed for failure to pay child support).
192. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 36, at 32–33 (outlining a number of
recommendations to address the extreme costs of “aggressive collection practices”).
193. R. Barry Ruback et al., Perception and Payment of Economic
Sanctions: A Survey of Offenders, 70 FED. PROBATION 26, 28 (2006).
194. Beckett & Harris, supra note 149, at 523; Alexes Harris et al., Courtesy Stigma and Monetary Sanctions: Toward a Socio-Cultural Theory of Punishment, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 234, 237 (2011); Harris et al., Drawing Blood, supra note 3, at 1786–87.
195. TOBIN, supra note 35, at 49.
196. Id. at 55 (quoting JOHN MATTHIAS ET AL., CURRENT PRACTICES IN
COLLECTING FINES AND FEES IN STATE COURTS: A HANDBOOK OF COLLECTION
ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 2 (1995), available at http://cdm16501.contentdm
.oclc.ord/cdm/ref/collection/financial/id/91).
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ment, what the authors called the miracle of the cells.
Threats can work if they are real, that is, if the threat is followed with action. But such coercion is expensive, and likely to
be more expensive than the money returned by the behavior.
And, there is evidence that at least some offenders who have
not paid restitution will pay if reminded that they owe the
money. An experimental study of 767 probationers who were
delinquent in paying the restitution they owed found that probationers who were sent information monthly for six months
about how much restitution they had paid and how much they
still owed paid significantly more than did individuals who did
198
not receive such information. Because payments continued
even after the letters stopped, the authors concluded that indi199
viduals had internalized the need to make payments.
Although payment may be possible for many offenders,
there is a real problem with obtaining payment from unemployed individuals who have no assets and are in danger of losing their possessions (e.g., car, home). Also problematic are individuals who realistically can be employed at jobs that are not
much above minimum wage but would still have problems with
paying expenses as well as criminal justice costs, fees, and
fines. The most problematic are individuals who are not employable for a given reason, such as the mentally ill, a group
that constitutes about ten-to-fifteen percent of individuals in
200
the criminal justice system. The ability of offenders to pay assessed economic sanctions may also depend, beyond their own
income and assets, on community characteristics that are related to offender reentry, such as social service organizations
(e.g., employment assistance, drug and alcohol treatment),
commercial establishments, manufacturing employment oppor201
tunities, and unemployment rates.
The offender’s ability to pay is the ultimate real-world limitation on economic sanctions, in that imposition can have only
symbolic value if payment is impossible. The issue, though, is
that in the United States, determining ability to pay is not
straightforward.
197. Weisburd et al., supra note 157, at 12.
198. Ruback et al., supra note 136, at 421.
199. Id. at 425.
200. See Matthew W. Epperson et al., Envisioning the Next Generation of
Behavioral Health and Criminal Justice Interventions, 37 INT’L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 427, 428 (2014) (noting several studies estimating the prevalence
of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system).
201. Jeffrey D. Morenoff & David J. Harding, Incarceration, Prisoner
Reentry, and Communities, 40 ANN. REV. SOC. 411, 420–21 (2014).
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Ability to pay concerns not only the question of whether
economic sanctions should be imposed but also, if they cannot
all be imposed (and paid), which ones and in what amounts
should be imposed. This question is of tradeoffs among the different types of economic sanctions.
B. TRADEOFFS
Imposing fines and costs and fees means that restitution is
less likely to be paid. Studies in Pennsylvania, using both
202
203
state-level data and data from four counties suggest that
the imposition of restitution is negatively related to the imposition of fines. Similarly, in a study of economic sanctions in
Philadelphia, Ruback found that the imposition of fines was
204
negatively related to the imposition of restitution. On the
other hand, there could be a positive relationship between economic sanctions, a pattern suggesting that judges might believe
that if offenders can pay one type of sanction, they can pay
them all. In four counties in Pennsylvania, Ruback et al. found
that the imposition of costs was positively related to the impo205
sition of fines. Similarly, in Philadelphia, Ruback found that
the imposition of costs was positively related to the imposition
206
of both restitution and fines. In their analysis of probation
207
fees in Illinois, Olson and Ramker found, consistent with the
negative relationship hypothesis, that probationers ordered to
pay both fines and probation fees had lower average monthly
fees than probationers ordered to pay only fees. However, they
also found, consistent with the positive relationship hypothesis,
that probation fees were more likely to be imposed and more
208
likely to be paid if fines were also imposed.
There is only limited research on the payment of economic
sanctions, given offenders’ generally inadequate ability to pay
all of the sanctions that are imposed. However, it is obvious
that there is a zero-sum issue about how offenders paying toward some sanctions may mean they are not paying toward
others. Moreover, aside from this issue of tradeoffs between
202. Ruback et al., supra note 9.
203. Ruback et al., supra note 106, at 178–79.
204. R. Barry Ruback, The Imposition of Economic Sanctions in Philadelphia: Costs, Fines, and Restitution, 68 FED. PROBATION 21, 25 (2004) [hereinafter Ruback, Imposition].
205. Ruback et al., supra note 106, at 179.
206. Ruback, Imposition, supra note 204, at 25.
207. Olson & Ramker, supra note 6, at 40.
208. Id. at 40, 43.
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types of economic sanctions, there are also questions about
tradeoffs between cases and between victims.
C. MULTIPLE CASES AND VICTIMS
One of the issues regarding the imposition of restitution
when multiple crimes are involved is which victims should receive restitution. In some states, victims can be “read-in” to a
plea agreement, whereas in other states victims can be included in a restitution order only if the defendant pleads guilty to
209
the offense involving the particular victims.
Restitution can be problematic because for a single crime,
there can be multiple victims. Which victim should have precedence? There is further complication when an offender has
multiple judicial proceedings across time, each proceeding hav210
ing multiple crimes, and each crime having multiple victims.
Economic sanctions can be difficult to apply because judges
often do not have accurate information about offenders’ ability
to pay. Relatedly, because offenders generally cannot pay all
that they owe, the imposition of economic sanctions calls for
policy judgments about which type of economic sanction should
be given precedence. The next section examines principles that
can serve as the basis for making these policy judgments.
IV. RULES FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
A problem in the setting of economic sanctions is whether
they are imposed consistently and fairly. Some research indicates that they are imposed differently with respect to location
211
212
(rural versus urban areas), type of crime, and offender
213
characteristics. These differences suggest a need for greater
uniformity in the imposition of economic sanctions.
I suggest that the use of economic sanctions should be governed by three principles: (1) concern for victims, (2) concern for
offenders, and (3) concern for society. Victims are innocent sufferers who face both tangible and intangible losses. Offenders
convicted of crimes face a number of challenges, particularly if
they are incarcerated as part of their sentence. The imposition
209. Victims Comm., supra note 103, at 11–12.
210. This question about determining the primacy of cases and of victims
within cases is beyond the scope of this article.
211. Olson & Ramker, supra note 6, at 43; Ruback et al., supra note 9, at
333.
212. Gordon & Glaser, supra note 143, at 672.
213. See Ruback & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 662 (noting several offender
characteristics judges claimed to consider when ordering restitution).
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of economic sanctions can be burdensome and may make it
more difficult for offenders to avoid recidivism, particularly
when offenders have other expenses (e.g., child support, alimony, housing, food, transportation). Society’s concerns with restoring victims and fairly punishing offenders also include acknowledging governmental responsibilities.
Table 1 summarizes the positive and negative effects of the
three types of economic sanctions—restitution, fines, and costs
and fees—on victims, on offenders, and on society.
A. RESTITUTION
For victims, restitution provides an institutionalized
means by which they can be compensated for their tangible
losses. Court-imposed restitution also gives victims notice that
society recognizes the harm they have suffered.
For offenders, restitution can make them recognize the
harm they have caused, can teach them responsibility by making them pay for that harm, and can serve as both a punish214
ment and deterrent. Although offenders perceive restitution
as somewhat unfair, they still perceive it as more fair than oth215
er economic sanctions.
Some studies have reported that the process of making
216
amends for one’s actions is what makes restitution effective.
That is, offenders who recognize the reparative benefits of restitution have lower recidivism rates. These studies suggest that
restitution may be effective because it emphasizes the benefits
to the victim and allows offenders to take responsibility for
217
their actions without stigmatizing them. Likewise, research
has indicated that successful completion of a restitution order
is generally one of the strongest predictors of lowered recidi218
vism.
Studies of juveniles have shown that although formal restitution (i.e., as a condition of probation or assigned through
214. MCGILLIS, supra note 22, at 13.
215. Ruback et al., supra note 193, at 30.
216. See Patricia Van Voorhis, Restitution Outcome and Probationers’ Assessments of Restitution: The Effects of Moral Development, 12 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 259, 279 (1985) (“Offenders who were rated as orienting to reparation
as the most salient concern were significantly more likely to complete restitution successfully.”).
217. Id. at 282.
218. Laurie Ervin & Anne Schneider, Explaining the Effects of Restitution
on Offenders: Results from a National Experiment in Juvenile Courts, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 183, 189 (Burt
Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1978).
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court) may be less effective than more informal restitution arrangements (i.e., residential programs or court diversion), it is
219
still more effective than straight probation or incarceration.
Studies have shown that reoffense rates for restitution cases
220
increase monotonically with the degree of court control. In
contrast, a study of juveniles in Utah found positive effects for
restitution regardless of whether juveniles were processed formally or informally, although the effect was more dramatic
221
among the informally-processed group. In general, studies
examining the effectiveness of restitution among juveniles have
shown that juveniles who pay restitution have lower rearrest
222
rates than juveniles who receive other sanctions.
Research on the use of restitution with adults is limited
but shows similar trends. In one study, adults in the Minnesota
Restitution Center who had to pay restitution had lower recidi223
vism rates than a group of incarcerated offenders. Likewise,
another study, which performed a two-year follow-up of adult
parolees, found that those randomly assigned to the Minnesota
Restitution Center had fewer new court commitments than
224
those on standard parole.
Finally, for society, restitution promotes the idea of restorative justice, by which the victims are compensated for their
losses and offenders can be reintegrated into society. The problem, though, is that the payment of restitution interferes with
the payment of economic sanctions that go to the state (primarily fines) and that go to the local jurisdiction (primarily costs
and fees).

219. See M.S. Rowley, Recidivism of Juvenile Offenders in a Diversion Restitution Program (Compared to a Matched Group of Offenders Processed
Through Court), in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION
supra note 218, at 217, 223 (observing that a study of offenders in a formal
restitution program compared to those not participating in restitution “indicated a clear difference . . . for both incidence and severity of subsequent offending”).
220. Peter R. Schneider et al., Juvenile Restitution As a Sole Sanction or
Condition of Probation: An Empirical Analysis, 19 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ.
47, 59 (1982).
221. JEFFREY A. BUTTS & HOWARD N. SNYDER, RESTITUTION AND
JUVENILE RECIDIVISM 4 (1992).
222. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 80, at 549–50 (concluding that restitution reduces recidivism for juvenile offenders).
223. Joe Heinz et al., Restitution or Parole: A Follow-up Study of Adult
Offenders, 50 SOC. SERV. REV. 148, 155 (1976).
224. Joe Hudson & Steven Chesney, Research on Restitution: A Review and
Assessment, in OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION 131, 139 (Burt
Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1978).
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B. FINES
For victims, fines have no benefits but do have costs in that
monies directed at paying fines interfere with the payment of
restitution. For offenders, fines can serve goals of deterrence
and punishment, and they can be used as intermediate punishments. For society, fines can be used for general governmental purposes, or they can be directed to specific purposes, such
as the victim compensation fund. From the viewpoint of society,
money used to pay fines may be money that is not being directed to victim restitution or to costs and fees.
C. COSTS AND FEES
For victims, costs and fees have no benefits, but do have
costs in that monies directed at paying fines interfere with the
payment of restitution, since payment of restitution orders typ225
ically follows other financial obligations (e.g., costs, fines).
For offenders, costs and fees can serve goals of deterrence
and punishment. However, offenders often perceive costs and
226
fees as unfair. Costs and fees can also greatly interfere with
an offender’s ability to function in society, particularly when
there are surcharges (e.g., interest) on amounts that remain
227
unpaid. For some offenders, the amounts of these costs and
fees, especially continuing ones like supervision fees, are so
high that they can never be paid off, which is the situation with
228
the private probation companies in the South.
For society, costs and fees can cover some of the costs of the
criminal justice system, but they transfer governmental duties
to offenders. Moreover, because these costs and fees are likely
to go primarily to criminal justice administrators in local jurisdictions, they interfere with the payment of restitution (meaning victims are less likely to receive compensation) and fines
(meaning that the state is less likely to receive funds). In addition, costs and fees are the responsibility of government, and
the Model Penal Code correctly notes that costs and fees for re225. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 9, at 357–58 (noting that
“restitution orders often are not first in the priority of court ordered payments”).
226. See Ruback et al., supra note 193, at 30 (“[O]ffenders did not perceive
the amounts of the economic sanctions or the procedures used to determine
them to be very fair.”).
227. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 149, at 518 (observing that, due to
surcharges and interest, legal debt often grows over time despite regular payments).
228. See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
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imbursing the criminal justice system cause a conflict of interest in the courts and agencies that impose, collect, and use the229
se monies. Moreover, costs and fees are of little or no benefit
to society, although private corporations seem to profit from the
arrangement.
The threat of incarceration for nonpayment of fees works
only if the threat is real. That is, courts must be willing to incarcerate individuals for nonpayment, as Weisburd et al. found
230
in their study. The costs of this enforcement are borne by so231
ciety.
Probation revocation for failure to pay economic sanctions
alone is probably relatively uncommon. Felony probationers
may have more than one violation and may have more than one
232
disciplinary hearing. Most often, judges are reluctant to incarcerate individuals for nonpayment because they are aware
233
of the monetary and social costs of incarceration. Wheeler et
al. found that in only seven percent of felonies and three percent of misdemeanors, judges revoked probation for nonpay234
ment or failure to report. Another study found that twelve
percent of probation revocations resulted at least in part from a
235
failure to pay court-ordered financial obligations. In sum, the
failure to pay economic sanctions is often simply one of several
reasons why an individual might face probation revocation.

229. Kevin R. Reitz, The Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommendations of the Model Penal Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735, 1760–66
(2015).
230. Weisburd et al., supra note 157, at 30.
231. The Brennan Center study indicated there is a cost of $130 per prisoner per day for incarcerations in California. BANNON ET AL., supra note 36, at
25. Even when private companies are involved, government bears the costs of
enforcement. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION:
AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 53 (2014), available at
http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2014/02/05/profiting-probation
(explaining
that governments still bear the cost of housing offenders when probation companies use incarceration to collect on debts).
232. BONCZAR, supra note 174, at 10 tbl.12.
233. See Ruback, Imposition, supra note 204, at 21 (observing that “there
are pressures for alternatives to prison, because of the high cost of incarceration”); Gerald R. Wheeler et al., Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: Dilemma for Human Service?, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 63, 74–75 (1990) (presenting data
that “showed a strong pattern of judicial tolerance for non-compliance”).
234. Gerald R. Wheeler et al., The Effects of Probation Service Fees on Case
Management Strategy and Sanctions, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 15, 22 (1989).
235. ROBYN L. COHEN, PROBATION AND PAROLE VIOLATORS IN STATE
PRISON, 1991 3 (1995).
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Economic sanctions can be useful as penalties for defend236
ants who are wealthy, and these sanctions may be of greater
benefit to society and the criminal justice system if applied to
those who committed economic crimes like stock fraud and
money laundering. The Model Penal Code also takes this approach, arguing that for offenders with the means to pay economic sanctions, “financial penalties would remain an im237
portant part of the sentencing armamentarium.” But it may
be useful to greatly reduce economic sanctions for the poor be238
cause they are not likely to be cost effective.

236. See Dickman, supra note 51, at 1711 (observing that, while many offenders are poor, there are some who “have the financial means to compensate
victims” but that “restitution orders are not being adequately enforced against
affluent offenders”).
237. AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING: COUNCIL DRAFT
NO. 4, at xviii (2013).
238. Dickman, supra note 51, at 1694–96.
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Table 1. Type and Effects (Positive and Negative) of
Economic Sanctions

V. CONCLUSIONS
This overview of the effects of the three different types of
economic sanctions leads to three conclusions: (1) restitution
should be mandatory; (2) costs and fees should not be imposed;
and (3) judges should be able to impose fines, based on the offender’s ability to pay.
A. RESTITUTION SHOULD BE MANDATORY
Restitution should be mandatory because it is good for victims, good for offenders, and good for society, and the fact that
restitution is not mandatory may reflect subtle victim blam239
ing. The need to focus on victims is based on the fact that vic239. The difficulty victims face in getting compensation from the state may
also reflect a subtle bias against victims. See ROBERT ELIAS, THE POLITICS OF
VICTIMIZATION (1986).
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tims, not governments, bear the greatest costs of crime. Although it has been argued in the United Kingdom that reducing
the costs of crime to victims is not a concern of the govern241
ment, the fact that victim restitution is authorized in every
state, including twenty that include it in the state constitution,
suggests that the costs victims endure are of concern to state
and local governments in the United States. Most of the economic losses victims suffer are not covered by insurance or, in
242
the United States, recompensed by government.
In other
countries, victims’ losses are covered by the state, which compensates the losses because of the violation of its duty to pro243
tect citizens or because of a social welfare rationale.
Restitution is qualitatively different from other types of
economic sanctions in that the funds go to the victim rather
than to a state agency. The amount of restitution awarded depends on the victim impact statement that the victim files with,
depending on the jurisdiction, the victim/witness agency or the
244
prosecutor. Amounts are for documented losses (e.g., the value of vandalized property) and out-of-pocket expenses (e.g.,
245
medical costs) directly related to the crime. Restitution is arguably good for offenders because it teaches them responsibility. And, restitution is good for society because of the symbolic
value attached to treating victims fairly and to emphasizing the
importance of restoring the victim to the status quo before the
crime.
If victim restitution is not made mandatory, then there is a
need to ensure that the state assumes the responsibility under
one or more of three rationales:
The philosophical basis for these programs varies from a legal tort
theory, whereby the state is seen to have failed to protect its citizens
adequately, to a humanitarian rationale through which all citizens
should receive assistance for their compelling needs, to a by-products
theory that recognizes victim satisfaction as a benefit to the criminal

In most jurisdictions, victims’ requests for restitution can
240. Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather Strang, Restorative Justice As Evidence-Based Sentencing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS 215, 228 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012).
241. Id.
242. Victim compensation covers only a tiny fraction of crimes, because victims are often unaware of the state funding and, even if they were aware,
there are so many qualifying conditions that most victims would not be entitled to receive any state funding.
243. See Robert Elias, Alienating the Victim: Compensation and Victim Attitudes, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 103, 106 (1984).
244. MCGILLIS, supra note 22.
245. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9.
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be part of a more general process of victim allocution at sentencing, in which the victim describes the impact of the crime.
The primary purposes of victim participation in sentencing are
to increase victim satisfaction with sentencing and criminal
justice, to make the determination of crime seriousness more
accurate, and to make both criminal justice professionals and
247
the offender more aware of the actual effects of the crime.
Although victim participation may accomplish these goals, it
has also been criticized because it could lead to inconsistent
sentencing (e.g., because of differential participation by victims
248
or differential persuasiveness of victims), to overly harsh sen249
tences, and to a violation of the decorum of the courtroom.
In contrast to victim allocution in general, restitution is a
relatively straightforward process that involves less discretion
on the part of the judge. Providing restitution to victims could
be explicitly part of a more general process of restorative justice, by which there can be reconciliation between the offender
and the victim, the victim’s losses are restored, and the offender is returned to the community. In this way, restitution could
play a role in promoting rehabilitation.
But even if restitution is not paid, there are important
symbolic aspects to the imposition of restitution. In a survey of
Pennsylvania judges, one judge wrote that, “Many judges in my
county feel criminals are not capable of paying restitution. My
250
experience has been they will pay if they face jail.” Even so, it
was much more common for judges to indicate that they had no
real expectation that the restitution would be paid. For example, another judge said, “This court expends significant resources, including regularly scheduled collection court proceedings, to collect limited amounts of ordered restitution due to
low income levels and poverty. Nevertheless, even collection of
small amounts reinforces the restorative nature of the judicial
251
system and the need to reinforce accountability to offenders.”
This recognition that much of the imposed restitution will
not be paid suggests that a judge’s purpose in ordering it is
primarily symbolic. The fact that restitution was made manda247. Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim
Input at Sentencing and Parole, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 347 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009).
248. Julian V. Roberts, Crime Victims, Sentencing, and Release from Prison, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note
240, at 104, 107–11.
249. Roberts, supra note 247.
250. RUBACK, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 110.
251. Id.
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tory is similar to other victims’ rights actions taken by state
legislatures, such as victim compensation and victim impact
statements, which many believe are more aimed at giving the
appearance of concern for victims rather than actually improv252
ing their condition.
B. COSTS AND FEES SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED
Offenders should not have to pay costs and fees. Thus, I
agree with the “categorical abolitionist position” taken by the
253
Model Penal Code. This issue is real, in that convicted offenders are often called on to pay for the costs of criminal justice. Most clearly, a National Public Radio report in 2014 by Joseph Shapiro reported that forty-three states allow a charge for
a public defender, forty-one states charge for jail, and forty-four
254
states charge for probation.
1. The Activities Covered by Costs and Fees Are Inherently
Governmental Responsibilities
The argument against imposing costs and fees on convicted
offenders is based on the distinction between general taxes, on
255
the one hand, and benefit taxes and user fees on the other.
General taxes are government levies on income, consumption,
property, or wealth and are used to support general public ser256
vices. Income taxes, corporate taxes, and sales taxes are examples of general taxes.
In contrast, “benefit taxes and user fees constitute mandatory or voluntary levies imposed on persons deriving particular
252. Elias, supra note 243; Edna Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, The Effect of
Victim Participation in Sentencing on Sentence Outcome, 28 CRIMINOLOGY
451, 453 (1990).
253. Reitz, supra note 229, at 1760. In the report by the Brennan Center
for Justice entitled Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, authors
Bannon, Nagrecha, and Diller argued that the problem is user fees, which are
explicitly intended to raise revenue. BANNON ET AL., supra note 36, at 4. Legislators do not give much thought to the consequences of raising the amounts for
old fees or creating new fees. Id. The analysis conducted by the authors examined laws and policies in the fifteen states with the largest prison populations.
This excellent study recommended that fees be discontinued, particularly fees
that impose additional costs on the indigent, such as payment plan fees, late
fees, collection fees, and interest. The report also recommended that fees for
legal representation by a public defender be eliminated. See id. at 32–33.
254. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 19, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/
increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor.
255. See David Duff, Benefit Taxes and User Fees in Theory and Practice,
54 U. TORONTO L.J. 391 (2004).
256. Id. at 391.
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benefits from specific categories of publicly provided goods and
257
services.” Benefit taxes and user fees differ in the extent to
which the benefit goes to a group or an individual. Benefit taxes are “compulsory levies applied to individuals (or institutions
such as corporations) who are assumed to benefit as a group
258
from certain government services.” Taxes on gasoline and
diesel fuel are benefit taxes because the drivers paying these
taxes are members of the group of vehicle owners who benefit
259
from the use of government-owned roads and highways.
User fees are amounts “levied on consumers of government
260
goods or services in relation to their consumption.” With user
fees, the amount of special benefits delivered to an individual
can be identified, along with the financing paid by the individual. To the extent that charges for water, sewage, and waste
disposal are related to the consumption of the service, these
261
charges are user fees. “The designation of user fees can also
be applied to charges for the use of public transit or public recreational facilities, tuition fees for higher education, road or
bridge tolls, resource royalties, and various kinds of environ262
mental taxes.” Under these definitions, the costs and fees imposed on convicted offenders are user fees.
Benefit taxes and user fees have both advantages and disadvantages. As an advantage, they increase economic efficiency, because they cause resources to go to the most highly valued
263
uses. They also increase the accountability of the public sector because they are more responsive to the public’s demand for
goods and services, and they are more fair, since taxpayers pay
264
only for those goods and services that they use. Benefit taxes
and user fees are criticized, however, because they may be more
257. Id. at 393.
258. Richard M. Bird & Thomas Tsiopoulos, User Charges for Public Services: Potentials and Problems, 45 CAN. TAX J. 25, 38–39 (1997).
259. See Duff, supra note 255, at 394.
260. Bird & Tsiopoulos, supra note 258, at 39. The Government Accountability Office describes federal user fees and charges as being “generally related
to some voluntary transaction or request for government goods or services beyond what is normally available to the public such as fees for national park
entrance, patent applications, and customs inspections. . . . [W]ell-designed
user fees can reduce the burden on taxpayers to finance those portions of activities that provide benefits to identifiable users.” GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 278 (2012), available at http://www
.gao.gov/assets/590/588818.pdf.
261. Duff, supra note 255, at 394.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 395.
264. Id. at 395–96.
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burdensome on the poor than on the wealthy, they undermine
the entire notion of publicly provided goods and services, and
budgetary flexibility is undermined if the revenues are ear265
marked for specific purposes. David Duff argues that benefit
taxes and user fees are appropriate for some purposes (e.g.,
transportation, water, sewage, waste disposal), inappropriate
for others (social services, public housing), and, in between, appropriate if access is granted on the basis of right or need (e.g.,
266
health care, education).
According to Duff, most publicly provided goods provide
267
both general benefits and specific benefits. For example, a
public park provides spaces for interactions for everyone and
268
recreation for individuals. Similarly, public health interventions can reduce the impact of epidemics, benefiting both the
269
general welfare and the health of individuals. Public and individual benefits also accompany publicly funded education,
270
transportation, and waste disposal programs.
Although it would be possible to fund these publicly provided services through a benefits tax or user fee, there are four
reasons why charging such fees is not appropriate. First, when
the good or service is fundamentally public, charging fees to in271
dividual users changes the nature of the good or service.
Thus, police protection, a public service, is fundamentally
changed to an individual service when individuals are charged
for their level of protection. Second, when benefits are distributed by right, need, or merit, benefit taxes and user fees are in272
appropriate. For example, if primary education is seen as a
right of citizenship, then it would be wrong to charge stu273
dents. Third, when the purpose of the public expenditure is to
redistribute resources, as with welfare payments, it makes no
274
sense to charge individual beneficiaries. Finally, if the benefits tax or user fee is regressive (i.e., has a disproportionate impact on the poor), the charge is probably unfair and inappropri275
ate unless there are some ways to offset the effect.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 396.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 411.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 413.
Id.
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According to Duff’s analysis, it is economically inefficient to
charge the cost to the user when there are public benefits, as
276
there are with public education. There is a continuum between pure public goods and pure private goods, which mirrors
the continuum between public funding and charging specific
277
users. In both Canada and the United States, user fees and
benefit taxes are more likely to be used at the local level rather
278
than the state or national level, a fact that is explainable because federal level expenditures are primarily social assistance
279
and national defense (a pure public good).
Duff argues that education (primary and secondary) and
health services benefit both the general public and individu280
als. Moreover, because basic education is a right and health
care is a need, he argues that a user fee approach based on ability and willingness to pay would undermine the public bene281
fits. Duff argues that the protection of persons and property
is not a proper subject for benefit taxes and user fees because of
282
the more general public benefits.
Duff argues that even if benefit taxes and user fees are appropriately imposed, the amount of the charges must still be
283
appropriate—“an economically sensible amount.” Duff speaks
in terms of the marginal cost of production, such that rates
should match the short-run marginal cost of producing the good
284
or service, although there must also be a consideration of
general benefits, uncompensated costs to third parties, and the
possible need for more complicated pricing arrangements when
285
there are declining marginal costs or substantial fixed costs.
Opportunity costs must also be considered.
The government should not be contracting out inherently
governmental functions. The question, though, is what makes a
function fundamentally public rather than private. Professor
Martha Minow suggests that the answer depends on traditional
practices, symbolism, and political theories about the role of
286
government. For example, because criminal prosecution has
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 416.
Bird & Tsiopoulos, supra note 258, at 39–40.
Duff, supra note 255, at 420–21.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 426.
Id.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 417–18.
Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the
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been handled primarily by the government for the past 200
years and because it has symbolism as a public action for the
good of the community and private victims, it is unlikely that it
would be contracted out to a private actor. The danger with
private actors, especially for-profit groups, is that “the appearance of private motives in a public domain can undermine respect for government and even generate doubt whether the
287
government is sincerely pursuing public purposes.”
One of the arguments for privatizing governmental functions is to reduce the size of government. Actually, of course,
288
governmental functions have merely been outsourced, creat289
ing a government by proxy. Four arguments have been made
in favor of privatization: (a) increasing quality and effectiveness; (b) creating competition and incentives for improvement;
(c) increasing pluralism, that is, giving groups the opportunity
to participate and self-govern; and (d) creating new knowledge
290
and infrastructure.
DiIulio argues that efficiency is not the only criterion for
“deciding who should make public policy, who should adminis291
ter public policy, and who should fund public policy.” According to DiIulio, it is difficult to separate making and administering public policy, since so much discretion is generally involved
in translating policy into action. Although DiIulio suggests that
“[i]t is easier to separate finance from administration than it is
to separate policymaking from administration,” funding deci292
sions still involve policy determinations.
If there is to be contracting out of governmental functions,
293
the key is public accountability,
which, following Hirsch294
man, means that governments “retain the option to exit relationships with private entities, the means to express disagreements with the ways in which the private entities proceed, and
the capacity to remain with the private entity as a vote of con295
fidence.” Government accountability comes through contracts
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1234 (2003).
287. Id. at 1234.
288. Id. at 1240.
289. See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1271 (2003).
290. Minow, supra note 286, at 1242–46.
291. DiIulio, supra note 289, at 1283.
292. Id.
293. Minow, supra note 286, at 1259.
294. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
295. Minow, supra note 286, at 1266.
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that specify terms and enforcement, are consistent with the
constitutional obligations of government, and require the re296
porting of information needed to assess compliance.
In terms of costs and fees in the criminal justice system,
these costs have been imposed because there is no one to argue
against them. Offenders generally do not have the right to vote,
and, even if they do, they have little influence over criminal
297
justice policy.
Governments are charging defendants with costs that are
the business of government. Moreover, when states charge defendants for an attorney to defend them, these charges amount
to a fee for exercising a constitutional right. Such charges are
an abdication of governmental responsibility, in the same way
that devolving the collection and monitoring of these charges to
private businesses is an improper delegation of duty.
2. If a Government Imposes Costs and Fees, Then the
Government, Not Private Businesses, Should Collect and
Monitor the Payment of Those Charges
In recent years, private corporations have begun operating
criminal justice services that had previously been performed by
the government. Because they have a pecuniary interest in the
behavior of the offenders they deal with, specifically wanting
the offenders to continue making payments on the original
owed amounts and on any additional fees, penalties, and surcharges that may have accrued, the field has become known as
298
“poverty capitalism” and an “‘offender-funded’ probation in299
dustry.”
There are two reasons why local governments contract out
300
this work to private companies. First, these contracts reduce
the costs of government and therefore the need to increase tax301
es to pay for the covered services. Second, because these added costs are borne by offenders, they amount to an additional
punishment beyond what had traditionally been imposed on
296. Id. at 1267–68.
297. Id.
298. Thomas B. Edsall, The Expanding World of Poverty Capitalism, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/thomas
-edsall-the-expanding-world-of-poverty-capitalism.html. Another example of
poverty capitalism high phone rates and money transfer fees charged to prison
inmates. See Stephanie Cliffort & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Prisons, SkyHigh Phone Rates and Money Transfer Fees, N.Y. TIMES, June. 26, 2014.
299. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 231, at 2.
300. Id. at 15–16.
301. Id.
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302

convicted offenders.
According to a Human Rights Watch report, companies
that supervise offender-funded probation have an incentive for
offenders not to pay off the amounts they owe: “[T]he longer it
takes offenders to pay off their debts, the longer they remain on
303
probation and the more they pay in supervision fees.”
That local governments need the money provided by fines
and fees became apparent in response to concerns about police
stops of motorists after the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2014. Slightly more than twenty
percent of the city’s $12.75 million budget came from municipal
304
court fines, and more than a third of the general revenues in
305
one nearby town came from court fines and fees.
One of the primary criticisms of private companies being
involved in the criminal justice system is that they are profiting
306
from the misfortunes of victims and offenders.
Moreover,
their focus on profit may cause them to want offenders not to
307
succeed, so that they can make more money. DiIulio believes
that profit per se is not the factor that precludes the privatization of criminal justice functions; rather, the legally-sanctioned
control over crime and punishment are inherently public be308
cause criminal justice actors act on behalf of the public. Indeed, criminal justice is one of the central functions of govern309
ment.
Just as DiIulio believes that government can be successful
310
at managing prisons, there is also reason to believe that probation officers can do a better job, not only of supervising offenders, but of inducing offenders to pay the economic sanctions
they owe. Some evidence suggests that when specialized collections agencies are involved in the collection of costs and fees,
the amount of money recovered is actually less than when pro-

302. Id. at 22; see also Beckett & Harris, supra note 149, at 517.
303. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 231, at 3.
304. Edsall, supra note 298.
305. Campbell Robertson & Joseph Goldstein, In Aftermath of Missouri
Protests, Skepticism About the Prospects for Change, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2014, at A1.
306. John J. DiIulio, Jr., What’s Wrong with Private Prisons, 92 PUB. INT.
66, 71 (1988) [hereinafter DiIulio, Private Prisons].
307. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 231, at 3.
308. DiIulio, Private Prisons, supra note 306, at 79.
309. Id. at 81 (quoting John Locke). But see CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE
PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 52–54 (1990).
310. DiIulio, Private Prisons, supra note 306, at 77.
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311

bation officers are supervising the procedure.
One of the real problems with private probation companies
is what is called “pay only” probation, which refers to individuals who are on probation not because of a threat to public safety
312
or need for supervision, but only because they owe fees. Private probation agencies generally deal with offenders “whose
313
offenses are often too minor to merit jail time.” The Human
Rights Watch report indicates that although the private probation companies account for the fees due to the court, they do not
314
report on the amount of fees paid to the company itself.
The Human Rights Watch report argues that pay-only probation is discriminatory for three reasons: (1) offenders have to
pay supervision fees only if they do not pay the total amount of
their fines immediately; (2) the fees are regressive because
poorer probationers pay a larger percentage of their payments
in fees than do individuals who can afford to make larger payments and because poorer probationers have to stay on probation for a longer period of time because they make smaller
payments; and (3) poorer individuals pay absolutely more in
315
fees because they are on probation longer.
For the companies that Human Rights Watch observed, offenders could not pay off their debts to the court before their
debt to the private probation company because the companies
316
ensured that the two debts were paid down simultaneously.
There is a hidden cost to the public for these fees, in that the
real threat for nonpayment is jail-time, a cost borne by the public, and one that might be greater than the amount of money
317
owed to the court. The Human Rights Watch report found
that courts often not only did not supervise the private probation agencies but also “delegate[d] a range of coercive powers to

311. Ruback & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 676; Ruback, Shaffer & Logue, supra note 106, at 183. As with non-criminal-justice debts, debtors may learn
that they can get away without paying their debts. See Jake Halpern, The
Debt Getters, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 17, 2014, at 26, 39. A recent experiment
suggests that there can be cost-effective ways for probation officers to induce
offenders to pay the restitution they owe. In the study, about half of offenders
who were delinquent in payment paid something after receiving notice of nonpayment. Ruback, Gladfelter & Lantz, supra note 136, at 420, 424–25.
312. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 231, at 25.
313. Stillman, supra note 185, at 50.
314. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 231, at 66.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 27.
316. Id. at 51.
317. Id. at 53.
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318

their probation companies.”
The Human Rights Watch report concluded that courts do
little to determine whether offenders are actually able to pay
319
their fines and fees. Moreover, the private probation companies have a direct interest in making sure that courts do not
320
decide that an offender is not able to pay the debt. The report
321
couched the argument in terms of human rights issues. Given
the public nature of the functions covered by costs and fees,
they should not be imposed on offenders. Moreover, given the
risks associated with privatizing their collection, if they are
imposed, they should be collected by government agencies.
C. JUDGES SHOULD HAVE DISCRETION TO IMPOSE FINES BASED
ON THE DEFENDANT’S ABILITY TO PAY
Judge should have the ability to impose fines, particularly
if these fines are used in lieu of incarceration. Judges should be
able to impose these fines based on the defendant’s ability to
pay and the impact of these fines on the defendant’s family and
dependents. Regarding fines, the Model Penal Code suggests
that, because there is little “punitive ‘value’” to economic sanctions, “economic sanctions other than victim restitution may
not be made formal ‘conditions’ of probation or postrelease supervision—meaning that nonpayment cannot be a basis for
322
sentence revocation.”
With respect to fines, I think it is too early to know wheth323
er fines can be useful for deterrence and rehabilitation. How324
ever, given the generally successful use of fines in Europe and
the need for some type of intermediate sanction short of incarceration, judges should have the option to impose fines, particularly for offenders whose crimes are linked to economic offenses.
The key point is that fines should be imposed based on
ability to pay. Most writers today advocate imposing financial
obligations that are based on the offender’s ability to pay.
318. Id. at 59.
319. Id. at 39.
320. Id. at 68.
321. See id. at 71.
322. Reitz, supra note 229, at 1766.
323. There are few studies that have investigated the question. One of the
few is The Use and Effects of Financial Penalties in Municipal Courts, Gordon
& Glaser, supra note 143. The study is limited by the fact that it examines
economic sanctions in a municipal court rather than a court that handled more
serious criminal offenses.
324. See Hillsman, supra note 2, at 77–79.
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McLean and Thompson suggested capping amounts at twenty
percent of an offender’s income and creating realistic payment
325
plans. Dickman suggested removing the mandatory amounts
326
beyond the offender’s ability to pay.
VI. MORE REALISTIC SUGGESTIONS
My suggestion of completely eliminating costs and fees is
unlikely to be implemented. Thus, I suggest some modifications
327
short of that dramatic change.
A. REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COSTS AND FEES, ESPECIALLY AT
THE COUNTY LEVEL
In our research in Pennsylvania, we have found that most
of the different economic sanctions (ninety percent of 2629 dif328
ferent sanctions) relate to county-level user costs and fees.
These fees are primarily aimed at generating funds for the
county rather than punishing, deterring, or rehabilitating of329
fenders. A reduction in the number of such fees would reduce
the economic burden on offenders.
The fact that there are more than 2600 different economic
sanctions in Pennsylvania is confusing not only to offenders,
who do not know how much they owe, how much their monthly
330
payments should be, and where the money they pay goes, but
also to judges, prosecutors, and probation officers. Conversations with court employees suggest that no one in the court system understands all of the economic sanctions or the order in
331
which they are supposed to be paid, despite regulations established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and promul332
gated by the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania. If clarity
is one goal of the legal system, then economic sanctions in
Pennsylvania do not meet this standard.
Moreover, this variety of sanctions is unfair to individuals
325. RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., REPAYING DEBTS 22–23 (2007), available at http://www
.csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/repaying_debts_full_report
-2.pdf.
326. Dickman, supra note 51, at 1707.
327. These suggestions come from Ruback, Abolition, supra note 116.
328. Ruback & Clark, supra note 108, at 761.
329. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 253–55.
330. Ruback, Hoskins, Cares & Feldmeyer, supra note 193, at 31.
331. RUBACK ET AL., EVALUATION, supra note 110, at 125.
332. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502 (2015) (authorizing promulgation of
regulations for collection of fees and costs).
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in counties that have a larger number of economic sanctions,
most of which are county costs and fees. These costs and fees
are imposed to shift the financial burden from the public to offenders, and counties with more of these costs and fees place
more of the burden on offenders. Unfairness can occur when
similar offenders in two different counties face different
amounts of costs and fees solely because one county imposes a
greater number of costs and fees.
One possible solution to the problem of so many different
types of economic sanctions is simply to reduce the number of
333
county costs and fees. The large number of possible countylevel economic sanctions explains most of the variation between
counties, and essentially the system as it presently stands rewards counties that are more creative in creating new costs and
fees. As long as the imposed costs and fees are consistent across
counties, one could claim that they are uniform and therefore
fair.
However, costs and fees that are unique to a county raise a
different question. How fair is it to an offender if the burden of
paying for the costs of criminal justice is shifted to offenders only if the county is poor and therefore cannot afford to pay? Or,
is it fair if the county has a large population of citizens who
generally oppose government and is therefore more likely than
populations in other counties to favor user fees? Although one
could argue that counties should be able to impose whatever
fees they wish, it would be difficult to defend these sanctions in
terms of fairness to offenders. That is, it would be difficult to
argue that offenders who live in certain counties should have to
pay higher costs and fees merely because of where they live, not
because of their actual offense.
B. MAKE PAYMENTS EASIER
The National Center for State Courts recommended that
collection of economic sanctions is likely to be improved if
courts make payments more convenient, for example through
333. Recently, there have been calls for the abolition of these fees for three
reasons: (1) they lack a clear penological rationale, (2) they raise questions of
fairness because they make sentences too severe, they reflect class bias, they
reflect disparity, and they have a large impact on families, and (3) they are not
cost-effective. Beckett & Harris, supra note 149, at 519–28. Based on their
analysis of fees in the fifteen states with the largest prison populations,
BANNON ET AL., supra note 36, at 32, have called for lawmakers to consider
the total debt burden on offenders before adding new fees or increasing fee
amounts. They also have suggested that indigent offenders should not have to
pay these fees. Id.
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credit-card payments, installment plans, incentive plans that
reduce amounts for those who comply with payment plans,
334
community service, and day fines based on income levels. The
notion behind the day-fine concept was that offenders should be
able to afford necessities less “the amount that serves to satisfy
pleasures, whatever these may be, such as wine, spirits and to335
bacco,” a concept that is also embodied in the Model Penal
336
Code’s notion of “reasonable living expenses.”
Questions remain concerning the degree to which offenders
should be allowed flexibility in payment. Events that make it
difficult or impossible for the offender to pay (e.g., illness, losing a job) are probably more likely among offenders than the
general public, thus suggesting that offenders should be allowed flexibility. Other questions relate to whether there
should be garnishment of wages, welfare payments, and tax refunds.
C. PRIORITIZE THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
Much of the objection to the current system of economic
sanctions is that the local and state governments get paid before others, particularly children due support and victims owed
restitution. Currently, there are often no clear priorities for the
337
collection of legal financial obligations.
Levingston and
Turetsky suggested that child support and victim restitution
338
should take precedence over fines, fees, and surcharges. It
would also be useful to have groups that collect legal financial
obligations share information, so that all of the agencies and
courts to which the offender owes money are aware of the total
amounts of money that are owed and the payment schedules
339
that have been imposed.
Also, as mentioned earlier, a single offender is likely to
have multiple victims, either from the same offense or from
multiple offenses, including victims whose victimizations were
340
not included in the plea agreement. Guidelines might be helpful for handling such cases, or the issue could be handled with a

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

TOBIN, supra note 35, at 56.
Faraldo-Cabana, supra note 161, at 10 (quoting Raffaele Garafalo).
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, § 6.04(2) (D.D. No. 4, 2012).
MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 325, at 17.
Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 36, at 187–97.
MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 325, at 21–22; see also PA. OFFICE
OF THE VICTIM ADVOCATE, supra note 132, at 36.
340. Supra text accompanying note 209.
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341

single payment plan across cases. But at the very least a list
of all of these victims and the amounts owed to them should be
made known to the sentencing court.
VII. FUTURE ISSUES
There are two issues that will need to be discussed in the
future. First, assuming there is variation between counties in
the imposition of economic sanctions, there may be a need for
economic sanction guidelines within a state. Second, there is a
need for further investigations of the extent of, and effects of,
variation between states.
A. SHOULD THERE BE STATE-WIDE GUIDELINES?
A rational system would also be one that understands the
cost effectiveness of the sanctions and determines that the costs
are defensible. There are administrative costs for handling economic sanctions, and it would be important to know how much
it costs state courts to process a seven dollar payment for state
costs, including staff time for recording the amount, computer
processing time (for those counties with computerized record
keeping), and monitoring of paper records (for those counties
without computer records of amounts owed and payments
made). These costs are especially problematic because many
economic sanctions involve relatively small amounts of money.
Our analyses indicated that three-quarters of all economic
342
sanctions imposed were for less than fifty dollars. Whether
and how much this is a problem depends on the costs involved
in imposing these sanctions, monitoring offenders to ensure
that the sanctions are paid, and intervening (e.g., by issuing
warnings, revoking probation) if they are not paid. Moreover, if
the amounts are not paid, warnings need to be given and probation officers need to make judgments about whether probation should be revoked. For parolees who have not made payments, decisions must be made about whether parole should be
revoked for a technical violation (failure to make payments).
Three changes are needed if we are to increase the likelihood that offenders will pay the economic sanctions imposed on
them. First, judges need better information about an offender’s
salary and assets. Now, even with presentence reports, judges
have little information about how much an offender would be

341. See PA. OFFICE OF THE VICTIM ADVOCATE, supra note 132, at 37.
342. Ruback & Clark, supra note 108, at 761 tbl.2.
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343

able to pay. Second, the amounts imposed should be geared
toward an offender’s salary and net worth, as is true with the
day fine concept as it is used in Europe. Third, there needs to
be some system to allow people without funds to pay, either
through community service for those who are on probation or
though prison salary for those who are incarcerated in a state
prison. The usual calculus is that one day in jail is equal to one
344
day of fines, which is equal to eight hours of work.
One option, currently embodied in the recommendations of
the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing for drug fines, is
to use community service hours as the starting point for the
345
proposed fine. These recommendations, limited to the lowest
levels of offense seriousness (Level 1 and Level 2 of the sentencing guidelines), use community service hours as the starting
point for the proposed fine, the rationale being that community
service can be ordered without consideration of the offender’s
346
ability to pay. Although a system of community service would
allow offenders who are without resources to pay the economic
sanctions imposed on them, such a system requires that the
county has the agencies and opportunities for the community
service and the staff to run the programs (e.g., to supervise
trash pickup). Such programs require an initial and continuing
outlay of county resources.
I have argued that a structure is needed for economic sanctions in order to increase fairness through uniformity, proportionality, certainty, and clarity. Bringing about a structure requires development of the issues outlined in this Article. But
before concluding, I also want to indicate some of the likely
problems that will need to be addressed. First, if a guideline
system is developed for economic sanctions, alone or as a package with incarceration and other sentencing alternatives, there
343. See Hillsman, supra note 2, at 91.
344. See, e.g., id. at 81 (describing the values set in the West German dayfine system).
345. 204 PA. CODE § 303.14 (2015).
346. See 38 Pa. Bull. 4971 (Sept. 6, 2008) (“The proposal links the number
of hours of community service recommended to the existing guideline recommendations, so that those offenders with more serious offenses or more extensive criminal history are recommended for more hours of community service.
At Level 1, which targets the least serious offenders, the current sentence recommendation is exclusively a Restorative Sanction (RS) sentence; for these
cells, the community service recommendation is 25-50 hours. At Level 2,
where the sentence recommendation contains a range that includes RS and a
minimum period of confinement, the number of hours of community service is
increased by increments of 25 hours (such as, RS-1 = 50-75 hours; RS-2 = 75100 hours).”).
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is the likelihood that, as with current guideline systems, prosecutors will still have most of the power and will thus be able to
avoid the guidelines if they wish.
Second, if an economic sanction is not imposed, for example
as part of a plea agreement, there is no one who will be able to
complain. Victims, particularly of crimes that have been bargained away, may not know of the plea and thus would be unlikely to complain. If state fines were not imposed, the state
would need some sort of continuing monitoring system to discover the omission. By contrast, county costs and fees, if not
imposed, would be likely to elicit complaints, as the county staff
needed for monitoring the imposition and payment of these
sanctions have both the ability and motivation to do so.
B. NEED FOR RESEARCH
As indicated earlier in connection with restitution, there is
variation among the states in the nature of economic sanctions.
Because of this variation, more work needs to be conducted on
the actual practice of how economic sanctions are imposed and
monitored. For example, research conducted in Washington
state may not be representative of the problem nationally because of the uniqueness of the law in Washington (e.g., the
garnishment of a spouse’s wages to pay legal financial obliga347
tions). At the other extreme, Pennsylvania, the state whose
economic sanctions I have investigated, may also be different
from other states. In Pennsylvania, judges in some counties use
a back-end adjustment to economic sanctions that are unpaid.
That is, they reduce or waive the economic sanctions if the offender is complying with the conditions of supervision or “is
348
making a good-faith effort to repay the debt.”
Moreover,
Pennsylvania does not charge interest on unpaid economic
349
sanctions. Unlike some other states, Pennsylvania does not
350
allow conversion of criminal financial obligations to civil debt.
And, finally, unlike thirteen of the fifteen states with the largest prison populations, Pennsylvania does not have a public de351
fender fee.
Policy questions are partly deontological and partly utilitarian. That is, there may be some part of a question that is
347. Beckett & Harris, supra note 149, at 518.
348. BANNON ET AL., supra note 36, at 40 n.55.
349. Id. at 45 n.89.
350. See id. at 27, 56 n.187 (omitting Pennsylvania from list of states exercising this practice).
351. Id. at 12.
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answerable in an absolute sense of right and wrong and some
part that can be answered only with knowledge of the effectiveness of the policy. Within-state and between-state differences in economic sanctions raise questions of fairness and
equal treatment that may be addressable by the law. But questions about these policies concerning economic sanctions are also in need of better information about how they actually work.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that victim restitution should
be mandatory, fines should be discretionary, and costs and fees
should be prohibited. Three themes governed this argument
about the imposition of economic sanctions. First, the law and
courts should be concerned about victims. They are innocent of
wrongdoing but face losses that are tangible and intangible,
and direct and indirect. Moreover, they are especially vulnerable in that they are likely to be victimized again. Because victimization is a predictor of offending, concern about crime victims might reduce the commission of crime.
Second, the law and courts should be concerned about offenders. The criminal justice system should help offenders reintegrate into society and should not burden them by imposing
extra fees or surcharges that directly support the criminal justice system, imposing fees as restitution, or imposing sanctions
that are not equally imposed on all (e.g., different costs and fees
in different counties). Moreover, the use of economic sanctions
should be structured so as to help offenders learn responsibility.
Third, the law and courts should be concerned about the
community. The use of economic sanctions should be cost effective. Moreover, their use should reflect concern about future
victim cooperation and reducing future victimizations.
Part of what makes a system fair is that (a) it is understood by everyone, both those who administer it and those on
whom it is imposed and (b) it is transparent, so that third parties (including victims) can easily determine whether it has
been imposed and enforced. The guidelines need to be understandable to four groups: decision makers in the criminal justice system, offenders, victims, and the general public. The individuals who make decisions about economic sanctions—
judges, prosecutors, probation officers, and court clerks—need
to understand them and to be able to explain them to others.
Offenders need to understand the way economic sanctions work
for purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence. They need to un-
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derstand that there is a link between their criminal behavior
and their economic payment. Thus, they need to know how
much they owe, where the money goes (e.g., the state, the county), and for what purposes. Victims also need to understand the
system, so that they have a better idea about the punishment
that offenders are undergoing and the likelihood that they will
receive restitution. Finally, it is important that the system be
understood by the general public, both to maintain some deterrent effect and to engender respect for the law.

